Economics, Student Value Edition Plus MyLab Economics with Pearson eText -- Access Card Package (7th Edition)
7th Edition
ISBN: 9780134833392
Author: R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O'Brien
Publisher: PEARSON
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Chapter 14, Problem 14.2.12PA
To determine
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Two cigarette manufacturers repeatedly play the following simultaneous-move billboard advertising game. If both advertise, each earns profits of $0 million. If neither advertises, each earns profits of $10 million. If one advertises and the other does not, the firm that advertises earns $20 million and the other firm loses $1 million. If there is a 10 percent chance that the government will ban cigarette sales in any given year, can the firms “collude” by agreeing not to advertise?
To advertise or not to advertise
Suppose that Creamland and Dairy King are the only two firms that sell ice cream. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn depending on whether or not it advertises:
(base to table)
For example, the upper right cell shows that if Creamland advertises and Dairy King doesn't advertise, Creamland will make a profit of $15 million, and Dairy King will make a profit of $2 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Creamland and Dairy King are both profit-maximizing firms.
If Creamland decides to advertise, it will earn a profit of $_____ million if Dairy King advertises and a profit of $____ million if Dairy King does not advertise.
If Creamland decides not to advertise, it will earn a profit of $______ million if Dairy King advertises and a profit of $_____million if Dairy King does not advertise.
If Dairy King advertises, Creamland makes a higher profit if it chooses (to…
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern play a game in which they simultaneously put down some number of coins with either a head or a tail showing on each coin. Rosencrantz puts down one coin and Guildenstern puts down two coins. Rosencrantz pays Guildenstern one dollar for each coin that shows the side that Rosencrantz played; for example, if Rosencrantz played a head and Guildenstern played a head and a tail, Rosencrantz would pay Guildenstern two dollars, since two heads were displayed among the three coins.
a. Formulate a strategic game that represents this situation.
b. Find all Nash equilibria of this game (including any mixed strategy equilibria).
c. For each of the Nash equilibria in (b), give Guildenstern’s expected payoff.
Chapter 14 Solutions
Economics, Student Value Edition Plus MyLab Economics with Pearson eText -- Access Card Package (7th Edition)
Ch. 14 - Prob. 14.1.1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.3RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.4PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.5PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.6PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.7PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.8PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.9PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.10PA
Ch. 14 - Prob. 14.2.1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.3RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.4RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.5PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.6PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.7PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.8PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.9PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.10PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.11PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.12PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.13PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.14PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.15PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.16PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.17PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.18PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.3PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.4PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.5PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.6PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.3PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.4PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.5PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.6PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.7PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.8PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2CTECh. 14 - Prob. 14.3CTE
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