Microeconomics, Student Value Edition (6th Edition)
6th Edition
ISBN: 9780134125756
Author: R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O'Brien
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 14, Problem 14.2.5PA
Sub part (a):
To determine
Pay off matrix of Bob and Tom.
Sub part (b):
To determine
Dominant strategy.
Sub part (c):
To determine
Dominant strategy.
Sub part (d):
To determine
Dominant strategy.
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3.4
Bernie and Leona were arrested for money laundering and were
interrogated separately by the police. Bernie and Leona were
each presented with the following independent offers. If one
confesses and the other doesn't, the one who confesses will go
free and the other will receive a 20-year prison sentence; if both
confess, each will receive a 10-year prison sentence.
Bernie and Leona both know that without any confessions, the
police only have enough evidence to convict them of the lesser
crime of tax evasion, and each would then receive a 2-year
prison sentence.
a. Use the information to construct a payoff matrix for
Bernie and Leona.
b. What is the dominant strategy for Bernie and for
Leona? Why?
c. Based on your response to the previous question, what
prison sentence will each receive?
Jane and Bill are apprehended for a bank robbery. They are taken into separate rooms and questioned by the police about their involvement in the crime. The police tell them each that if they confess and turn the other person in, they will receive a lighter sentence. If they both confess, they will be each be sentenced to 30 years. If neither confesses, they will each receive a 20-year sentence. If only one confesses, the confessor will receive 15 years and the one who stayed silent will receive 35 years. The table below represents the choices available to Jane and Bill.
If Jane trusts Bill to stay silent, what should she do? A = Confess; B = Stay Silent (Each results entry lists Janes's sentence first (in years), and Bill's sentence second.)
Jane
A
B
Bill
A
(30, 30)
(15, 35)
B
(35, 15)
(20, 20)
Jane and Bill are apprehended for a bank robbery. They are taken into separate rooms and questioned by the police about their involvement in the crime. The police tell them each that if they confess and turn the other person in, they will receive a lighter sentence. If they both confess, they will be each be sentenced to 30 years. If neither confesses, they will each receive a 20-year sentence. If only one confesses, the confessor will receive 15 years and the one who stayed silent will receive 35 years. The table below represents the choices available to Jane and Bill.
Which criminal(s) have a dominate strategy to cheat? A = Confess; B = Stay Silent. (Each results entry lists Janes's sentence first (in years), and Bill's sentence second.)
Jane
A
B
Bill
A
(30, 30)
(15, 35)
B
(35, 15)
(20, 20)
Question 3 options:
Only Bill has a dominate strategy so he should cheat
Only Jane has a dominate strategy so she should cheat
Both Bill…
Chapter 14 Solutions
Microeconomics, Student Value Edition (6th Edition)
Ch. 14 - Prob. 14.1.1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.3RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.4RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.5PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.6PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.7PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.8PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.9PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.10PA
Ch. 14 - Prob. 14.2.1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.3RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.4RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.5PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.6PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.7PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.8PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.9PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.10PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.11PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.12PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.13PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.14PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.15PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.16PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.17PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.18PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.19PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.20PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.3PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.4PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.5PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.6PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.3PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.4PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.5PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.6PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.7PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.8PA
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