Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN: 9781305506381
Author: James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Question
Chapter 15A, Problem 1.3CE
To determine
To Explain: The auction design that would be in the best interest of the seller as to whether it should be single-round bid or multiple round open bidding.
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You have three tickets to a Celtics game on a night that you are going to be out of town (so the value of unsold tickets is zero to you). There are only four possible buyers of a Celtics ticket. The table below lists the respective reservation prices of these four possible buyers:
Customer Reservation Price
1 $25
2 $35
3 $50
4 $60
a) How much revenue can you generate using the English auction mechanism from the sale of the first ticket? [Bids can be made in increments of $1.00]
b) How much revenue can you generate using the English auction mechanism from the sale of the second ticket? [Bids can be made in increments of $1.00]
c) How much revenue can you generate using the English auction mechanism from the sale of the third ticket? [Bids can be made in increments of $1.00]
d) How much total revenue can you generate using the English…
Explain how the strategic choice of reservation price can raise expected profitability yet threaten efficiency in an English auction.
Consider the following situation: five individuals are participating in an auction for an old bicycle used by a famous cyclist. The table below provides the bidders' valuations of the cycle. The auctioneer starts the bid at an offer price far above the bidders' values and lowers the price in increments until one of the bidders accepts the offer.
Bidder
Value ($)
Roberto
750
Claudia
700
Mario
650
Bradley
600
Michelle
550
What is the optimal strategy of each player in this case?
Who will win the auction if each bidder places his or her optimal bid?
If Claudia wins the auction, how much surplus will she earn?
Chapter 15A Solutions
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
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Similar questions
- Explain how an auction to sell a consumer-facing banking division might be used to determine the value of the division.arrow_forward“While auctions are appealing in theory, the challenges of auction design in practice are insurmountable” discussarrow_forwardConsider an English auction with 3 bidders having the valuations v1=12, v2=7, and v3=9. What will be the revenue to the seller?arrow_forward
- Your company is competing in a sealed-bid auction for a package of items your company values at $30,000. You expect the bids to be uniformly distributed between $20,000 and $30,000. a. Fill in the following table Bid Profit P(Win)Competitors = 2 E(Profit)Competitors = 2 P(Win)Competitors = 3 E(Profit)Competitors = 3 $20,000 $22,000 $24,000 $26,000 $28,000 $30,000 b. If there are two competitors, what is the optimal bid? c. If there are three competitors, what is the optimal bid?arrow_forwardAnalyze the pure Nash equilibrium and mixed Nash equilibrium strategies in the following manufacturer–distributor coordination game. How would you recommend restructuring the game to secure higher expected profit for the manufacturer?arrow_forwardExplain why a player in a sealed-bid, second-price auction would never submit a bid that exceeds his or her true value of the object being sold. (Hint: What if all players submitted bids greater than their valuations of the object?)arrow_forward
- Evaluate the following statement: “Predatory pricing in a market is a Nashequilibrium strategy whether or not the incumbent has an advantage; hence, it canwork in practice”. Include diagrams to aid you in your analysis when appropriate.arrow_forwardThree firms are bidding for the rights to provide cable television services. The demand for cable television is given by the equation P=100-Q. Firm 1 has an average cost of AC1 = 10, Firm 2 has an average cost of AC2 = 20, and Firm 3 has an average cost of AC3 = 30. If the rights are awarded using an English auction, approximately what is the resulting price and quantity of services provided? (A). P= 10; Q = 90. (B). P = 20; Q = 80. (C). P = 30; Q = 70. (D). P = 20; Q = 90. (E). P = 10; Q = 80.arrow_forwardPJ has been owning a City Golf, model 2004 for the past 15 years and now plans to sell it. Town auctioneers has offered to sell his car at their next auction. This is the first time PJ is hearing at an auction. PJ has approached you to explain to him what auction means and asked you if he should sell his car on auction or not. Briefly explain to PJarrow_forward
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