Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN: 9781337106665
Author: Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 16, Problem 8MC
To determine
Bargaining.
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(1) Patricia owns a cleaning business with Sarah. They both have other jobs and are trying to determine the number of hours to work at the cleaning business. The following payoff matrix shows their daily incomes depending on the number of hours they work at the cleaning business.
If Patricia chooses to work full time and Sarah works part time, what will each earn in daily income?
A-Patricia will earn $60; Sarah will earn $60. B-Patricia will earn $50; Sarah will earn $80.
C-Patricia will earn $80; Sarah will earn $50. D-Patricia will earn $55; Sarah will earn $55.
E-Indeterminate
(2) Company A and Company B are each telecommunications manufacturers. Both companies manufacture the same products, and they make their decisions based on the other's actions. Both companies are considering opening retail outlets to increase their profits. The payoff matrix shows the profits of the companies in millions of dollars if they choose to open retail outlets.
The government imposes a new $5…
Daniel and Kevin are two hardworking builders for solo, independently-owned companies. They can produce Chairs and Tables. As a result, they each have PPFs (Possibilities Production Frontiers) that illustrate their production. Daniel's PPF is shown by the equation: Qc = 12 - 3Qt. Likewise, Kevin's PPF is shown by the equation: Qt = 12 - 3Qc. Since they trust each other and are honest in their terms, Daniel and Kevin trade with each other and only each other; they do not take their goods to markets, and they do not interact with outside sellers/buyers. Since they want to make sure that they provide for their families in the most fair way possible, they set up and agree upon a few terms of trade. The terms are as follows: FIRST, the terms of trade are 1 Chair in exchange for 1 Table. SECOND, each of them specializes according to their own comparative advantage. THIRD, since Kevin needs a few extra things, he CONSUMES 3 units of the goods that he produces.
With that said, I have a few…
The conventional wisdom for urban economic development is: “Don’t put all your eggs in one basket. Diversify the economy.” To explain the idea of diversification, consider old McDonald, who must carry a dozen eggs from the barn to the house. The ground between the barn and the house is slippery, so there is a 50 percent chance that McDonald will slip on a given trip and break all the eggs in his basket. Consider two strategies: a one-basket strategy (a single trip with all 12 eggs) and a two-basket strategy (two trips, with 6 eggs per trip). INDEPTH ANSWERS.
Questions= (1.)List all of the possible outcomes under each of the strategies.
Question (2.)What is the expected number of delivered (unbroken) eggs under each strategy ?
Question (3.)What are the trade-offs between the two strategies? If you were McDonald, which strategy would you adopt?
Question (4.)What are the lessons for economic development strategies?
Chapter 16 Solutions
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
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