MYECON LAB W/PEARSON ETEXT MICROECON>IP
9th Edition
ISBN: 9780134153988
Author: PINDYCK
Publisher: PEARSON
expand_more
expand_more
format_list_bulleted
Question
Chapter 17, Problem 1E
To determine
Brand name as a signal of quality.
Expert Solution & Answer
Want to see the full answer?
Check out a sample textbook solution
Students have asked these similar questions
One method of solving this problem is through signaling. Signaling is a strategy one uses when they have information. The goal is to use a signal to convince the buyer that the good or service that is being sold is quality and will meet the buyer's wants.
Offer an example of a company that uses a signal to help sell its product. What is the signal?
What information is the signal trying to convey?
Do you think the signal is effective? Why or why not?
Does this signal improve market efficiency? Why or why not?
Pick a good and explain how asymmetric or imperfect information could impact the price and confidence of a buyer or seller.
What are some ways a seller of goods might reassure a possible buyer who is faced with imperfect information?
Chapter 17 Solutions
MYECON LAB W/PEARSON ETEXT MICROECON>IP
Knowledge Booster
Similar questions
- Can employees, managers, and executives have too much information?arrow_forwardYou start an insurance company as your first entrepreneurial venture after graduation. Your main product line is malpractice insurance for dentists. After exhaustive research, you learn that settling malpractice claims against careful dentists costs $2,000 and settling malpractice claims against reckless dentists costs $7,500. Individual dentists know whether they are reckless or careful, and your research shows that approximately 20% of dentists are reckless. How much do should you charge for malpractice insurance to break even?arrow_forwardHow do guarantees and warrantees serve as a method of reducing adverse selection inthe market for electronicsarrow_forward
- How might adverse selection make it difficult for an insurance market to operate?arrow_forwardExplain how risk aversion makes a market for insurance possiblearrow_forwardThe text points out that asymmetric information can have deleterious effects on market outcomes. a. Explain how asymmetric information about a hidden action or a hidden characteristic can lead to moral hazard or adverse selection. b. Discuss a few tactics that managers can use to overcome these problems.arrow_forward
- If people get higher pay from insurance than their premiums. Will this increase or decrease the death rate of average persons? Is this an example of moral hazard or adverse seletion? How will an insurance company deal with these problems?arrow_forwardIn the famous court case Stambovsky v. Ackley a prospective homebuyer attempts to back out of a purchase after learning that the home was widely believed to be haunted since the current owner had it included in a tour of haunted homes. Prior to the prospective buyer backing out, what imperfect information situation applied to this situation? Explain.arrow_forwardIf people get higher pay from insurance than their pre premiums. Will this increase or decrease the death rate of average persons? Is this an example of moral hazard or adverse selection? How will an insurance company deal with these problems.arrow_forward
arrow_back_ios
arrow_forward_ios
Recommended textbooks for you
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving ApproachEconomicsISBN:9781337106665Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike ShorPublisher:Cengage Learning
Economics (MindTap Course List)EconomicsISBN:9781337617383Author:Roger A. ArnoldPublisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Cengage Learning
Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:9781337617383
Author:Roger A. Arnold
Publisher:Cengage Learning