Is the median voter theorem useful to analyze the election.

Question

Want to see the full answer?

Answer 1

Question

Chapter 18, Problem 18.1.6PA

To determine

Is the median voter theorem useful to analyze the election.

Expert Solution & Answer

Want to see the full answer?

Check out a sample textbook solution

See solution

Students have asked these similar questions

In 1989, Senator Bob Packwood asked Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation how much extra revenue the government would raise if it just started taxing 100% of all income over $200,000 per year. The Joint Committee crunched some numbers and reported an answer: $204 billion per year. a. What is wrong with this answer? In 1989, very few people made over $200,000 a year, so the estimate of the tax revenue is far too high. Increasing government spending by $204 billion each year would have generated economic growth, and subsequently even higher amounts of tax revenues. The Joint Committee on Taxation did not have the tools needed to make such an estimate accurately. No one would have an incentive to work once they had earned $200,000, so much of the taxable income would disappear.

Different Schools of thought propose theories to explain government failure. Based on public choice theory, briefly explain the foundations of government failure.

Political Economy Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election. Voter Id Preference(1-9) A 4 B 5 C 6 True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6. B) Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? C) Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? D) If the tax in C induces…