MICROECONOMICS(LL)
21st Edition
ISBN: 9781260279085
Author: McConnell
Publisher: MCG
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Chapter 24, Problem 3RQ
To determine
Dr. Jan behavior in the given example.
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Suppose that the price elasticity for hip replacement surgeries is 0.2. Further suppose that hip replacement surgeries are originally not covered by health insurance and that at a price of $50,000 each, 10,000 such surgeries are demanded each year. LO24.2 a. Suppose that health insurance begins to cover hip replacement surgeries and that everyone interested in getting a hip replacement has health insurance. If insurance covers 50 percent of the cost of the surgery, by what percentage would you expect the quantity demanded of hip replacements to increase? What if insurance covered 90 percent of the price? If insurance covers 50 percent of the bill, just assume that the price paid by consumers falls 50 percent.) b. Suppose that with insurance companies covering 90 percent of the price, the increase in demand leads to a jump in the price per hip surgery from $50,000 to $100,000. How much will each insured patient now pay for a hip replacement surgery? Compared to the original situation,…
As one of the largest and fastest-growing industries in 2018, health care provided how many jobs for wage and salary workers? O 18 million 30 million 3 pts O 24 million O 12 million
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Suppose that the market demand for medical care is summarized by the demand function: Qd = 100-2p and the market supply is summarized by the supply function: Qs= =20+2p (1) Calculate the equilibrium quantity and price, assuming no health insurance is available. (2) Suppose that health insurance is made available that provides for a 20 percent coinsurance rate. Calculate the new equilibrium price and quantity. (Hint: How does the demand curve shift?) (3) Calculate the deadweight loss due to this insurance.
Chapter 24 Solutions
MICROECONOMICS(LL)
Ch. 24 - Prob. 1DQCh. 24 - Prob. 2DQCh. 24 - Prob. 3DQCh. 24 - Prob. 4DQCh. 24 - Prob. 5DQCh. 24 - Prob. 6DQCh. 24 - Prob. 7DQCh. 24 - Prob. 8DQCh. 24 - Prob. 9DQCh. 24 - Prob. 10DQ
Ch. 24 - Prob. 11DQCh. 24 - Prob. 12DQCh. 24 - Prob. 13DQCh. 24 - Prob. 14DQCh. 24 - Prob. 15DQCh. 24 - Prob. 16DQCh. 24 - Prob. 17DQCh. 24 - Prob. 18DQCh. 24 - Prob. 1RQCh. 24 - Prob. 2RQCh. 24 - Prob. 3RQCh. 24 - Prob. 4RQCh. 24 - Prob. 5RQCh. 24 - Prob. 6RQCh. 24 - Prob. 7RQCh. 24 - Prob. 1PCh. 24 - Prob. 2PCh. 24 - Prob. 3P
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