Microeconomics: Principles Problems & Policies (McGraw-Hill Series in Economics)
20th Edition
ISBN: 9780077660727
Author: McConnell
Publisher: MCG
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Chapter 4, Problem 7RQ
To determine
True or false.
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Suppose that there are three beachfront parcels of land available for sale in Asilomar and six people who would each like to purchase one parcel. Assume that the parcels are essentially identical and that the minimum selling price of each is $445,000. The following table states each person's willingness and ability to purchase a parcel.
Person
Willingness and Ability to Purchase
(Dollars)
Ana
510,000
Charles
470,000
Dina
420,000
Gilberto
390,000
Juanita
380,000
Yakov
600,000
Which of these people will buy one of the three beachfront parcels? Check all that apply.
A. Ana
B. Charles
C. Dina
D. Gilberto
E. Juanita
F. Yakov
Assume that the three beachfront parcels are sold to the people that you indicated in the previous section. Suppose that a few days after the last of those beachfront parcels is sold, another essentially identical beachfront parcel becomes available for sale at a minimum price of $432,500. This fourth…
Complete the accompanying table and answer the accompanying questions. (L01, LO6, LO7)
a. At what level of the control variable are net benefits maximized?
b. What is the relation between marginal benefit and marginal cost at this levelof the variable?
Control Variable Q
Total Benefits B(Q)
Total Cost C(Q)
Net Benefits N(Q)
Marginal Benefit MB(Q)
Marginal Cost MC(Q)
Marginal Cost MC(Q)
100
1200
950
60
101
1400
70
102
1590
80
103
1770
90
104
1940
100
105
2100
110
106
2250
120
107
2390
130
108
2520
140
109
2640
150
110
2750
160
Suppose the total benefit and total cost to society of various levels of pollution abatement are as follows:
Complete column (4).
(Enter
your responses as
integers.)
(1)
Pollution Abatement
(2)
Total Benefit
(3)
Total Cost
(4)
Total Net Benefit
(5)
Marginal Benefit
(6)
Marginal
Cost
0
0
0
nothing
—
—
1
22
9
nothing
2
42
20
nothing
3
60
33
nothing
4
76
48
nothing
5
90
65
nothing
6
102
84
nothing
(1)
Pollution Abatement
(2)
Total Benefit
(3)
Total Cost
(4)
Total Net Benefit
(5)
Marginal Benefit
(6)
Marginal
Cost
0
0
0
—
—
1
22
9
13
2
42
20
22
3
60
33
27
4
76
48
28
5
90
65
25
6
102
84
18
Using optimization in levels, if the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) wants to…
Chapter 4 Solutions
Microeconomics: Principles Problems & Policies (McGraw-Hill Series in Economics)
Ch. 4.A - Prob. 1ADQCh. 4.A - Prob. 2ADQCh. 4.A - Prob. 3ADQCh. 4.A - Prob. 1ARQCh. 4.A - Prob. 2ARQCh. 4.A - Prob. 3ARQCh. 4.A - Prob. 1APCh. 4 - Prob. 1DQCh. 4 - Prob. 2DQCh. 4 - Prob. 3DQ
Ch. 4 - Prob. 4DQCh. 4 - Prob. 5DQCh. 4 - Prob. 6DQCh. 4 - Prob. 7DQCh. 4 - Prob. 8DQCh. 4 - Prob. 9DQCh. 4 - Prob. 1RQCh. 4 - Prob. 2RQCh. 4 - Prob. 3RQCh. 4 - Prob. 4RQCh. 4 - Prob. 5RQCh. 4 - Prob. 6RQCh. 4 - Prob. 7RQCh. 4 - Prob. 1PCh. 4 - Prob. 2PCh. 4 - Prob. 3PCh. 4 - Prob. 4PCh. 4 - Prob. 5PCh. 4 - Prob. 6PCh. 4 - Prob. 7P
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