EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
12th Edition
ISBN: 9781305176386
Author: Snyder
Publisher: YUZU
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Question
Chapter 4.1, Problem 3MQ
To determine
Actuarially fair price for the given gamble.
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Solve the following problem using an excel spreadsheet. A tobacco company isinterested in hiring a salesperson to promote smoking cigarettes in nightclubs. The position pays a flat salary of $50,000, regardless of sales levels. The firm has two applicants, Predictable Patty and Risky Ricky. Predictable Patty can produce with 100% certainty $100,000 a year in sales. Risky Ricky, on the other hand, can produce $300,000 with probability of 50%. But if he turns out to spend his time drinking and dancing in the nightclubs instead of making sales, he could actually cost the firm -$100,000 per year.a) During their first year on the job, what are the expected sales of Patty and Ricky? What are the firm’s expected profits on each worker?b) Now assume both workers are currently 25, and they will work until the retirement age of 65. The firm has the option to fire its new employee after one year based on sales, but can only hire one employee. Assume that it takes only one year to discover whether…
Burger Prince Restaurant is considering the purchase of a $100,000 fire insurance policy. The fire statistics indicate that in a given year the probability of property damage in a fire is as follows:
Fire Damage
$100,000
$75,000
$50,000
$25,000
$10,000
$0
Probability
.006
.002
.004
.003
.005
.980
If Burger Prince was risk neutral, how much would they be willing to pay for fire insurance?
If Burger Prince has the utility values given below, approximately how much would they be willing to pay for fire insurance?
Loss
$100,000
$75,000
$50,000
$25,000
$10,000
$5,000
$0
Utility
0
30
60
85
95
99
100
You have a 50 percent chance of making $0, a 40 percent chance of making $100, and a 10 percent chance of losing $100. Calculate the expected value and variance of the payoff.
Chapter 4 Solutions
EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
Ch. 4.1 - Prob. 1MQCh. 4.1 - Prob. 2MQCh. 4.1 - Prob. 3MQCh. 4.2 - Prob. 1TTACh. 4.2 - Prob. 2TTACh. 4.2 - Prob. 1MQCh. 4.3 - Prob. 1TTACh. 4.3 - Prob. 2TTACh. 4.3 - Prob. 1MQCh. 4.3 - Prob. 2MQ
Ch. 4.3 - Prob. 3MQCh. 4.3 - Prob. 1.1TTACh. 4.3 - Prob. 1.2TTACh. 4.3 - Prob. 2.1TTACh. 4.3 - Prob. 2.2TTACh. 4.3 - Prob. 1.1MQCh. 4.3 - Prob. 2.1MQCh. 4.3 - Prob. 3.1MQCh. 4.4 - Prob. 1TTACh. 4.4 - Prob. 2TTACh. 4 - Prob. 1RQCh. 4 - Prob. 2RQCh. 4 - Prob. 3RQCh. 4 - Prob. 4RQCh. 4 - Prob. 5RQCh. 4 - Prob. 6RQCh. 4 - Prob. 7RQCh. 4 - Prob. 8RQCh. 4 - Prob. 9RQCh. 4 - Prob. 10RQCh. 4 - Prob. 4.1PCh. 4 - Prob. 4.2PCh. 4 - Prob. 4.3PCh. 4 - Prob. 4.4PCh. 4 - Prob. 4.5PCh. 4 - Prob. 4.6PCh. 4 - Prob. 4.7PCh. 4 - Prob. 4.8PCh. 4 - Prob. 4.9PCh. 4 - Prob. 4.10P
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