MICROECONOMICS (LL) W/CONNECT
21st Edition
ISBN: 9781260583540
Author: McConnell
Publisher: MCG CUSTOM
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Chapter 5.A, Problem 1ARQ
To determine
Paradox of voting.
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4.1. The vote-for-two method works as follows: Candidates get apoint whenever a voter ranks them first or second. The candidate withthe most points is declared to be the winner (or if several candidates tiefor the most points, they are all declared to be winners).(a) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Condorcet criterion?(b) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the anti-Condorcet criterion?(c) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Pareto property?(d) Is the vote-for-two method independent?
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- 4.12. A social choice function satisfies the bottom criterion if, whenever a candidate is not at the bottom of the preference list of any voter,that candidate is a winner.(a) Does the plurality method satisfy the bottom criterion?(b) Does the antiplurality method satisfy the bottom criterion?(c) Explain why it is impossible for a social choice function with three ormore candidates to satisfy both the bottom criterion and the Paretocriterion.arrow_forwardSuppose that there are three beachfront parcels of land available for sale in Asilomar and six people who would each like to purchase one parcel. Assume that the parcels are essentially identical and that the minimum selling price of each is $445,000. The following table states each person's willingness and ability to purchase a parcel. Person Willingness and Ability to Purchase (Dollars) Ana 510,000 Charles 470,000 Dina 420,000 Gilberto 390,000 Juanita 380,000 Yakov 600,000 Which of these people will buy one of the three beachfront parcels? Check all that apply. A. Ana B. Charles C. Dina D. Gilberto E. Juanita F. Yakov Assume that the three beachfront parcels are sold to the people that you indicated in the previous section. Suppose that a few days after the last of those beachfront parcels is sold, another essentially identical beachfront parcel becomes available for sale at a minimum price of $432,500. This fourth…arrow_forward2.9. The following informal descriptions of voting methods do not represent social choice functions as we have defined them. Explain why not.(a) (Mini-quota) Any candidate with at least 25% of the votes is declareda winner.(b) (Approval voting) Every voter answers a yes-or-no question abouteach candidate: “Is she acceptable?” Whichever candidate is acceptable to the most voters is declared the winner.(c) (Copeland without ties) The winners of the Copeland method become our finalists. If there is more than one finalist, the tie is resolvedby drawing straws.(d) (Condorcet candidate) Pick the candidate who defeats each of theother candidates in a head-to-head electionarrow_forward
- 3 7- Consider an election contested by two candidates L & R; when L spends $x million on advertising and R spends $y million. L will get a share x/(x+y) of the votes and R will get y/(x+y). Assume the cost of campaigning is proportional to direct campaign expenditures x & y. Let us suppose that candidate L payoff is measured by its vote percentage minus its advertising expenditure 100 x/(x+y) – x. Similarly, candidate R’s payoff is 100y/(x+y) – y. Find the best response function for each candidate? What is the NE? Is it efficient?arrow_forwardSuppose that friends Jennifer, Stephanie, and Megan cannot agree on how much to spend for a bouquet of flowers to send to a person who allowed them to use her beach house for the weekend. Jennifer wants to buy a moderately priced bouquet, Stephanie wants to buy an expensive bouquet, and Megan wants to buy a very expensive bouquet. Assuming no paradox of voting, majority voting will result in the decision to buy Multiple Choice an inexpensive bouquet. a very expensive bouquet. a moderately priced bouquet. an expensive bouquet. Barrow_forwardThree players (Allen, Mark, Alice) must divide a cake among them. The cake is divided into three slices.The table below shows the value of each slice in the eyes of each of the players. S1 S2 S3 Allen $7.00 $6.00 $5.00 Mark $4.00 $4.00 $4.00 Alice $5.00 $4.00 $6.00 Which of the slices does Allen deem fair? Group of answer choices S1 and S2 S1 and S3 S2 and S3 S1, S2, and S3 S1 onlyarrow_forward
- urgent 1.15. Consider the Supreme Court as an electorate of 9 members thatvotes yes-or-no on a variety of issues. It is customary for this electorateto use the simple majority method, and since 9 is an odd number, no tiescan result when no justices are absent. Imagine the following alternativemethod for determining Supreme Court decisions. The decision is affirmative whenever at least 3 of the first 5 justices vote to affirm. Otherwisethe decision is negative. This is just the bloc voting method, where thejustices form blocs of size 5, 1, 1, 1, and 1. (This method emulates whatwould occur if the first 5 justices were to agree to always vote as a blocand to decide among themselves how the bloc should rule.)(a) Is this method anonymous?(b) Is this method neutral?(c) Is this method monotone?(d) If you were one of the 4 justices not among the first 5, why wouldyou complain about this voting method?arrow_forwardExplain how affirmative and negative majority votes can sometimes lead to inefficient allocations of resources to public goods. Is this problem likely to be greater under a benefits-received or under an ability-to-pay tax system? Use the information in Figures 17.1a and 17.1b to show how society might be better off if Adams were allowed to buy votes.arrow_forwardSuppose demand and supply are given by: (LO3, LO4)Qx d = 14 − 1/2Px and Qx s = 1/4Px − 1c. How much tax revenue does the government earn with the $12 tax when the new equilibrium quantity is 2 units after tax .arrow_forward
- 1) Which is the Nash equilibrium if Boeing produces and why ? 2) Suppose home is a small exporter of wheat. At the price of $100 per ton, home growers exports 20 tons. Now Suppose the home government decides to support its domestic producer with an export subsidy of $40 per ton. Use the following figure to answer these questions. 2) Suppose home is a small exporter of wheat. At the price of $100 per ton, home growers exports 20 tons. Now Suppose the home government decides to support its domestic producer with an export subsidy of $40 per ton. Use the following figure to answer these questions. 2) Suppose home is a small exporter of wheat. At the price of $100 per ton, home growers exports 20 tons. Now Suppose the home government decides to support its domestic producer with an export subsidy of $40 per ton. Use the following figure to answer these questions. a) What is the quantity exported under free trade and with the export subsidy? b) Calculate the effect…arrow_forwardComplete the accompanying table and answer the accompanying questions. (L01, LO6, LO7) a. At what level of the control variable are net benefits maximized? b. What is the relation between marginal benefit and marginal cost at this levelof the variable? Control Variable Q Total Benefits B(Q) Total Cost C(Q) Net Benefits N(Q) Marginal Benefit MB(Q) Marginal Cost MC(Q) Marginal Cost MC(Q) 100 1200 950 60 101 1400 70 102 1590 80 103 1770 90 104 1940 100 105 2100 110 106 2250 120 107 2390 130 108 2520 140 109 2640 150 110 2750 160arrow_forward1.17. Jones and Smith are running for public office. There are 99 voters.(a) Suppose the rules say that Jones wins if she receives 50 or morevotes; otherwise Smith wins. Is this method neutral?(b) Suppose the rules say that a candidate wins if he or she receivesa number of votes that is between 60 and 89. (If neither candidategets a winning number of votes, then the election is a tie.) Is thismethod monotone?(c) Suppose the rules say that a candidate wins if he or she receives anodd number of votes. (If neither candidate gets a winning numberof votes, then the election is a tie.) Is this method decisive?(d) Suppose that the rules say that Smith wins the election no matterwhat. Is this method anonymous?arrow_forward
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