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EBK COMPUTER NETWORKING
7th Edition
ISBN: 8220102955479
Author: Ross
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 8, Problem P18P
a)
Program Plan Intro
Given Information:
It is given that Alice wants to send an e-mail to Bob. Bob has a public-private key pair (KB+ ,KB–), and Alice has Bob’s certificate. But Alice does not have a public, private key pair. Alice and Bob share the same hash function H(.).
b)
Program Plan Intro
Given Information:
It is given that Alice wants to send an e-mail to Bob. Bob has a public-private key pair (KB+ ,KB–), and Alice has Bob’s certificate. But Alice does not have a public, private key pair. Alice and Bob share the same hash function H(.).
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Students have asked these similar questions
Can anyone please explain to me why we have such equations below in part b) and c)? They are the solutions to the questions, but I can't really understand why and how to get that. Many thanks.
==== QUESTION ====
In the Shamir secret sharing scheme, we distribute a secret among q different users as follows. If our secret is a message (m1, . . . , mk) from V (k, q) then, we encode it as a codeword of the Reed-Solomon RSk(q) and give one coordinate to each user. In this problem, we will use q = 7, k = 4 and the parity check matrix H4 below for RS4(7). H4 = [1 1 1 1 1 1 1, 0 1 2 3 4 5 6, 0 1 4 2 2 4 1]
a) Write a generator matrix for RS4(7)
b) A new secret is selected and user #1 receives share value 0, user #2 receives share value 6 and user #3 receives share value 1 and are collaborating to discover the new secret. Explain why they can’t recover the secret with only this information.
c) Now, suppose users #1, #2 and #3 (as in the previous item) discover, in addition to the values of…
We know that a digital signature is for the purpose of ensuring data integrity and authenticity. a) Checksum adds all the bits of the message (or blocks), is checksum a good way to construct a digital signature scheme? How about a hash function, i.e, Sign(M)= h(M)?b) If we use a hash to generate a signature in a more complicated way as follows Sign(k,m) = σ = h(k) XOR m XOR h(m), and m, σ will be sent along. Would this be a secure signature? Briefly explain.
please do not use chegg or ai tool like chat gpt please
Question 15
For Questions 15.1 - 15.2 consider the following integers: In a RSA cryptosystem with public-
key (3233, 59), compute:
15.1 the private-key and give you final answer as an ordered pair (n, d).
Chapter 8 Solutions
EBK COMPUTER NETWORKING
Ch. 8 - Prob. R1RQCh. 8 - Prob. R2RQCh. 8 - Prob. R3RQCh. 8 - Prob. R4RQCh. 8 - Prob. R5RQCh. 8 - Prob. R6RQCh. 8 - Prob. R7RQCh. 8 - Prob. R8RQCh. 8 - Prob. R9RQCh. 8 - Prob. R10RQ
Ch. 8 - Prob. R11RQCh. 8 - Prob. R12RQCh. 8 - Prob. R13RQCh. 8 - Prob. R14RQCh. 8 - Prob. R15RQCh. 8 - Prob. R16RQCh. 8 - Prob. R17RQCh. 8 - Prob. R18RQCh. 8 - Prob. R19RQCh. 8 - Prob. R20RQCh. 8 - Prob. R21RQCh. 8 - Prob. R22RQCh. 8 - Prob. R23RQCh. 8 - Prob. R24RQCh. 8 - Prob. R25RQCh. 8 - Prob. R26RQCh. 8 - Prob. R27RQCh. 8 - Prob. R28RQCh. 8 - Prob. R29RQCh. 8 - Prob. R30RQCh. 8 - Prob. R31RQCh. 8 - Prob. R32RQCh. 8 - Prob. R33RQCh. 8 - Prob. P1PCh. 8 - Prob. P2PCh. 8 - Prob. P3PCh. 8 - Prob. P4PCh. 8 - Prob. P5PCh. 8 - Prob. P6PCh. 8 - Prob. P8PCh. 8 - Prob. P12PCh. 8 - Prob. P13PCh. 8 - Prob. P14PCh. 8 - Prob. P18PCh. 8 - Prob. P20PCh. 8 - Prob. P21PCh. 8 - Prob. P22PCh. 8 - Prob. P23P
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Similar questions
- Suppose Alice used a Hash function HA to encrypted her sensitive data. Everyone in the public can access her encrypted data. Group of answer choices She must keep HA secret and should not share it with others. She can share HA with other users. She must keep HA secret but can share it with others after encryption. None of the above.arrow_forwardSuppose Alice computes the Secret suffix MAC (page 322: secret suffix MAC(x) = h(x || key)) for the message ”GD” (in ASCII) with key " H”(in ASCII) that both Alice and Bob know. The hash function that is used is h(x1x2x3)= g(g(x1 XOR x2) XOR x3 ) where each xi is a character represented as 8 bits, and g(x) is a 8-bit string that is equal to the complement of bits in x. For example, g(10110011) = 01001100. The MAC is 8 bits. (8-bit ASCII representation of the characters is given below.) What is the Secret suffix MAC computed by Alice? Show the MAC as the single character. What information is sent by Alice to Bob.arrow_forwardSuppose Alice computes the Secret suffix MAC (page 322: secret suffix MAC(x) = h(x || key)) for the message ”AM” with key “G” that both Alice and Bob know. The hash function that is used is h(x1x2x3)= g(g(x1 XOR x2) XOR x3 ) where each xi is a character represented as 8 bits, and g(x) is a 8-bit string that is equal to the complement of bits in x. For example, g(10110011) = 01001100. The MAC is 8 bits. (8-bit ASCII representation of the characters is given below.) What is the Secret suffix MAC computed by Alice? Show the MAC as the single character. What information is sent by Alice to Bob.arrow_forward
- Alice computes the Secret prefix MAC (page 322: secret prefix MAC(x) = h(key || x)) for the message ”GD” (in ASCII) with key “H” (in ASCII) that both Alice and Bob know. The hash function that is used is h(x1x2x3)= g(g(x1 XOR x2) XOR x3 ) where each xi is a character represented as 8 bits, and g(x) is a 8-bit string that is equal to the complement of bits in x. For example, g(10110011) = 01001100. The MAC is 8 bits. (8-bit ASCII representation of characters is available at https://www.asciitable.com/ Take the Hexa equivalent and convert it to 8 bits each. For example character "A" is hexa 41 or 0100 0001 in bits) What is the Secret prefix MAC computed by Alice? Show the MAC as the single character. What information is sent by Alice to Bob?arrow_forwardAlice and Bob use the ElGamal scheme with a common prime q= 131 and a primitive root a = 6. Let Bob's public key be YB= 3. A. What is the ciphertext of M=9 if Alice chooses the random integer k=4? B. If Alice uses the same k to encrypt two messages M1 and M2 as (12, 65) and (12, 64), what is the relation between M1 and M2?arrow_forwardSuppose that you receive a digital certificate that contains M and (h(M)]CA, where M = (Alice, Alice's public key) and "CA" is Certificate Authority. Assuming that you trust the CA, after verifying the signature on the certificate, what do you then know about the identity of the sender of the certificate? Remember that: [Xleob indicates encryption via Bob's private key to X (signature) h(X) indicates the cryptographic hash function applied to X O The sender is Alice O The sender is Trudy I cannot deduce the identity of the sender from the certificate The sender is the Certificate Authorityarrow_forward
- Consider an RSA key set for Alice with p = 23, q = 17, n = 391 and e = 15.a) Her public key is (e, n) = (15, 391). Is her private key (d, n) = (47, 391)? JusVfy your answer. b) Suppose Bob wants to encrypt a message 90 for Alice using RSA keys for confidenVality. Whatis the corresponding cipher text?Justify your answer.arrow_forwardThe Lingala Language of Republic of Congo has 35 letters. Consider an Affine cipher, which encrypts each letter according to the rule: C=(p×k1+k2) mod 35. Here C, p, k1, and k2 are each members in the range 0 to 34, where C represents the ciphertext letter, p the plaintext letter, and k1 and k2 are constant keys. How many possible keys does this affine system have? Explain in details.arrow_forwardElgamal Signature Scheme: Given the following table describing the procedure for Alice to send a signed message with Elgamal signature to Bob, calculate the unknown entities and verify that Bob has received the correct message sent by Alice. Alice Bob Chooses p=23 Chooses a primitive element α=5 Choose a random integer d=4 Compute β = αd mod p = Public key is kpub = (p, α, β) = Private key is kpr = d = Send Public key kpub = (p, α, β) to Bob: Receives Alice’s public key kpub = (p, α, β)= Choose an ephemeral key KE = 7 Message to send is m=8 Computes signatures (s,r) for m r= αKE mod p = Compute KE-1 mod (p-1) s= (m-d*r)* KE-1 mod (p-1) = Send (m, (r,s)) to Bob: Receives (m, (r,s)) = Compute t = βr * rs mod p = Verifies if t = αm mod p =arrow_forward
- Suppose you have a signature scheme S (which is correct and existentially unforgeable), and S can be used to sign any t-bit message. And you have a hash function H which outputs t bits and is collision-resistant. Consider a modified signature scheme S’ which can sign messages of unlimited length, where: S’.Sign(sk, m) = S.sign(sk, H(m)) Prove that this scheme is existentially unforgeable as long as S is existentially unforgeable and H is collision-resistant.arrow_forward1. Let (01, 02, 03,..., 026!} be the set of permutations of the alphabet A = {A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z}, and consider the simple substitution cryptosystem with ok = A B C D E F G H I J K L M X MTAK ZQB NO LES N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z IF G R V JH CY UDP W and key k. (a) Compute C = e(AUBUR NUNIV ERSIT YATMO NTGOM ERY, k). (b) Compute M = d(NIZFV SXHNF IHBKF VPXIA KIHVF GP, k).arrow_forwardSuppose that Alice and Bob communicate using ElGamal cipher and f (p. 9. Z) is common public values. Bob generates his private key d ER Z and then computes the corresponding and public public key y=g" (mod p). To save time, Bob uses the same number r each time he encrypts a plaintext message m (ie., r is a fixed nonce of Bob, and it is not randomly generated each time encryption is performed). Assume that Alice compute the ciphertext for the message m as (cc) = (g mod p, mxy mod p). and for the message m as (1,2)=(g" mod p, xy' mod p). Show how an adversary who possesses a plaintext-ciphertext pair (m. (c.ca)) can decrypt (1, 2) without knowing the private key d of Bob.arrow_forward
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