MANAGERIAL/ECON+BUS/STR CONNECT ACCESS
9th Edition
ISBN: 2810022149537
Author: Baye
Publisher: MCG
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Chapter 9, Problem 12PAA
To determine
Impact of technical advancement on production and pricing plans.
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You are the manager of BlackSpot Computers, which competes directly with Condensed Computers to sell high-powered computers to businesses. From the two businesses’ perspectives, the two products are indistinguishable. The large investment required to build production facilities prohibits other firms from entering this market, and existing firms operate under the assumption that the rival will hold output constant. The inverse market demand for computers is P = 5,900 − Q, and both firms produce at a marginal cost of $800 per computer. Currently, BlackSpot earns revenues of $4.25 million and profits (net of investment, R&D, and other fixed costs) of $890,000. The engineering department at BlackSpot has been steadily working on developing an assembly method that would dramatically reduce the marginal cost of producing these high-powered computers and has found a process that allows it to manufacture each computer at a marginal cost of $500. How will this technological advance impact…
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a) Find the Coumot equilibrium quantity per firm and market price.
Suppose Giocattolo of Italy and American Toy Company of the United States are the only two firms producing toys for sale in the U.S. market. Each
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MCo = ATCO is the long-term market supply schedule for toys.
Suppose Giocattolo and American Toy Company operate as competitors, and the cost schedules of each company are MCo = ATCO = $10.
On the following graph, use the grey point (star symbol) to identify the competitive market equilibrium. Then, use the green triangle (triangle
symbols) to identify consumer surplus in this case.
Note: Select and drag the point from the palette to the graph. Dashed drop lines will automatically extend to both axes. Then select and drag the
shaded region from the palette to the graph. To resize the shaded region, select one of the points and move to the desired position.
?
PRICE (Dollars per toy)
20
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16
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10
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6
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2
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Chapter 9 Solutions
MANAGERIAL/ECON+BUS/STR CONNECT ACCESS
Ch. 9 - Prob. 1CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 2CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 3CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 4CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 5CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 6CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 7CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 8CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 9CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 10CACQ
Ch. 9 - Prob. 11PAACh. 9 - Prob. 12PAACh. 9 - Prob. 13PAACh. 9 - Prob. 14PAACh. 9 - The opening statement on the website of the...Ch. 9 - Prob. 16PAACh. 9 - Prob. 17PAACh. 9 - Prob. 18PAACh. 9 - Prob. 19PAACh. 9 - Prob. 20PAACh. 9 - Prob. 21PAACh. 9 - Prob. 22PAACh. 9 - Prob. 23PAACh. 9 - Prob. 24PAA
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