MANAGERIAL/ECON+BUS/STR CONNECT ACCESS
9th Edition
ISBN: 2810022149537
Author: Baye
Publisher: MCG
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Question
Chapter 9, Problem 9CACQ
(A)
To determine
Whether the given statement best reflects the feature of Cournot , Sweezy , Stackelberg or Bertrand duopoly market.
(B)
To determine
Whether the given statement best reflects the feature of Cournot, Sweezy , Stackelberg or Bertrand duopoly market.
(C)
To determine
Whether the given statement best reflects the feature of Cournot, Sweezy , Stackelberg or Bertrand duopoly market.
(D)
To determine
Whether the given statement best reflects the feature of Cournot, Sweezy, Stackelberg or Bertrand duopoly market.
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Students have asked these similar questions
Duopoly quantity-setting firms face the market demand
p=270 -a.
Each firm has a marginal cost of $30 per unit.
What is the Cournot equilibrium?
The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (q,) and Firm 2 (92) are
units
and
92 = units. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.)
A duopoly faces an inverse market demand of P(Q) = 240−Q.Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of MC1 (q1) = $10.Firm 2's constant marginal cost is MC2 (q2) = $20.Assume fixed costs are negligible for both firms. Calculate the output of each firm, market output, and price if there is (A) a collusive equilibrium or (B) a Cournot equilibrium.
(A) Collusive equilibrium (Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places)
The collusive equilibrium occurs where q1 equals ?and q2 equals ?
Market output is ?
The collusive equilibrium price is ?
(B) Cournot equilibrium (Enter your responses using rounded to two decimal places)
The Nash-Cournot equilibrium occurs where q1 equals ?
and q2 equals ?
Market output is ?
The equilibrium occurs at a price of ?
A duopoly faces a market demand of p= 120 - Q. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of MC' =S10. Firm 2's constant marginal cost is MC = S20. Calculate the
output of each firm, market output, and price if there is (a) a collusive equilibrium or (b) a Cournot equilibrium.
The collusive equilibrium occurs where q, equals
and q, equals (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places)
Market output is
The collusive equilibrium price is S
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium occurs where q, equals and q2 equals
Market output is
Furthermore, the Cournot equilibrium price is S
Chapter 9 Solutions
MANAGERIAL/ECON+BUS/STR CONNECT ACCESS
Ch. 9 - Prob. 1CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 2CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 3CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 4CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 5CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 6CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 7CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 8CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 9CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 10CACQ
Ch. 9 - Prob. 11PAACh. 9 - Prob. 12PAACh. 9 - Prob. 13PAACh. 9 - Prob. 14PAACh. 9 - The opening statement on the website of the...Ch. 9 - Prob. 16PAACh. 9 - Prob. 17PAACh. 9 - Prob. 18PAACh. 9 - Prob. 19PAACh. 9 - Prob. 20PAACh. 9 - Prob. 21PAACh. 9 - Prob. 22PAACh. 9 - Prob. 23PAACh. 9 - Prob. 24PAA
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