Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780134492049
Author: Daron Acemoglu, David Laibson, John List
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 9, Problem 5P
(a)
To determine
The maximum number of fishes caught collectively.
(b)
To determine
The number of fish collected by person J, if J knows that remaining 9 fishers are fishing lightly collectively.
(c)
To determine
The number of fish collected by person J, if J knows that remaining 9 fishers are fishing intensely collectively.
(d)
To determine
The condition in which one individual can be better off by fishing lightly on first day, if possible.
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Three players (Allen, Mark, Alice) must divide a cake among them. The cake is divided into three slices.The table below shows the value of each slice in the eyes of each of the players.
S1
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Allen
$7.00
$6.00
$5.00
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Alice
$5.00
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$6.00
Which of the slices does Allen deem fair?
Group of answer choices
S1 and S2
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S1 only
Two individuals each receive fifty dollars to play the following game. Independently of each other, they decide how much money to put in a common pot. They keep the rest for themselves. As for the money in the pot, it is increased by 80% and then distributed equally among the two individuals. For instance, suppose that the first individual puts $10 in the pot while the second individual puts $20. Increasing the total pot of $30 by 80% gives $54 to share equally between the two individuals. So the first individual’s payoff in this case is $(40 + 27) = $67, while the second individual’s payoff is $(30 + 27) = $57.
(a) Compute the Nash equilibrium.
(b) Is the Nash equilibrium Pareto efficient? Explain
Two friends are deciding where to go for dinner. There are three choices, which we label A, B, and C.
Max prefers A to B to C. Sally prefers B to A to C.
To decide which restaurant to go to, the friends adopt the following procedure:
First, Max eliminates one of three choices.
Then, Sally decides among the two remaining choices.
Thus, Max has three strategies (eliminate A, eliminate B, and eliminate C). For each of those strategies, Sally has two choices (choose among the two remaining).
a.Write down the extensive form (game tree) to represent this game.
b.If Max acts non-strategically, and makes a decision in the first period to eliminate his least desirable choice, what will the final decision be?
c.What is the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the above game?
d. Does your answer in b. differ from your answer in c.? Explain why or why not.
Only typed Answer
Chapter 9 Solutions
Microeconomics (2nd Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
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