Holdup: Consider an ultimatum game (T = 1 bargaining game) in which before player 1 makes his offer to player 2, player 2 can invest in the size of the pie. If player 2 chooses a low level of investment (L) then the size of the pie is small, equal to vL, while if player 2 chooses a high level of investment (H) then the size of the pie is large, equal to VH. The cost to player 2 of choosing L is c1, while the cost of choosing H is CH. Assume that ví > V1 > 0, cH > CL > 0, and vH - CH > vL = CL· What is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game? Is it Pareto optimal? b. Can you find a Nash equilibrium of the game that results in an outcome that is better for both players as compared to the unique subgame- perfect equilibrium?
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- Consider a setting in which player 1 moves first by choosing among threeactions: a, b, and c. After observing the choice of player 1, player 2 choosesamong two actions: x and y. Consider the following three variants as towhat player 3 can do and what she knows when she moves:a. If player 1 chose a, then player 3 selects among two actions: high andlow. Player 3 knows player 2’s choice when she moves. Write down theextensive form of this setting. (You can ignore payoffs.)b. If player 1 chose a, then player 3 selects among two actions: high andlow. Player 3 does not know player 2’s choice when she moves. Writedown the extensive form of this setting. (You can ignore payoffs.)c. If player 1 chose either a or b, then player 3 selects among two actions: high and low. Player 3 observes the choice of player 2, but not that of player 1. Write down the extensive form of this setting.(You can ignore payoffs.)Suppose Martha earns an of income 400 Birr currently, and her utility function is given by: U(m) = 4m, where m represents income. She has two options: Option 1: to buy a share. If she is successful her income will be 700 Birr and if she is not successful her income will be 100 Birr. Option 2: to do nothing and keep on earning 400 Birr. Assuming that success and failure are equally likely, a) What would be her expected income if she buys the share? b) What would be her expected utility of buying the share? c) Would Martha buy the share? Why? and Is Martha risk averse, risk lover or risk neutral?Suppose that the buyers do not know the quality of any particular bicycle for sale, but the sellers do knowthe quality of the bike they sell. The price at which a bike is traded is determined by demand and supply.Each buyer wants at most one bicycle.(ii) Assuming that each buyer purchases a bike only if its expected quality is higher than the price,and each seller is willing to sell their bike only if the price exceeds their valuation, what is theequilibrium outcome in this market?
- [Adverse Selection] Each of the two players receives an envelope, in which there is anamount of money that is equally distributed from $0, $1, $2, ..., $100. The amounts in twoenvelopes are independent. After receiving the envelope, each individual can check exactlyhow much money is put in his/her own envelope. Then each player has the option to exchangehis/her envelope for the other individual's prize. The decisions are made simultaneously. Ifboth individuals agree to exchange, then the envelopes are exchanged; otherwise, if at leastone player chooses not to exchange, each individual keeps his/her own envelope and receivesits attached sum of money.a. Model this game as a static Bayesian game (write the normal formrepresentation) and find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.b. Consider a new game where the probability distribution of money in eachenvelope is changed. The amount is equal to $100 with probability 90%, and is equalto each number in $0, $1, $2, ... ,$99 with probability 0.1%.…A woman with current wealth X has the opportunity to bet an amount on the occurrence of an event that she knows will occur with probability P. If she wagers W, she will received 2W, if the event occur and if it does not. Assume that the Bernoulli utility function takes the form u(x) = with r > 0. How much should she wager? Does her utility function exhibit CARA, DARA, IARA? Alex plays football for a local club in Kumasi. If he does not suffer any injury by the end of the season, he will get a professional contract with Kotoko, which is worth $10,000. If he is injured though, he will get a contract as a fitness coach worth $100. The probability of the injury is 10%. Describe the lottery What is the expected value of this lottery? What is the expected utility of this lottery if u(x) = Assume he could buy insurance at price P that could pay $9,900 in case of injury. What is the highest value of P that makes it worthwhile for Alex to purchase insurance? What is the certainty…1. In the Traveler’s Dilemma, each of two people chooses a number between 180and 300. Each is paid the lower of the two numbers, but the person who choosesthe higher number must pay an amount x to the person who chose the lowernumber. In one case, x = 5, while in the other case x = 180. What differencewould you expect between choices with the two values of x?a. Higher choices when x = 5.b. Higher choices when x = 180.c. Little or no difference.d. Impossible to predict.2. Consider these statements about communication in experiments.1. Chat communication is usually more effective than written simple signals (A,B, etc.).2. Friendly appeals to mutual interest and payoff dominance are effective.3. Promises often affect beliefs and actions.4. A promise is not worth the paper it is printed on.Which of these are true?a. 1 and 2b. 1 and 3c. 2 and 3d. 1, 2, and 33. A treasure is hidden under one of the four boxes below. A person gets twoguesses to find the treasure. What do you think is the most…
- Let’s use the Fisher effect to use two known values to learn about the unknown third one. Consider the table, with some values given and some missing. ?i ??Eπ ?EquilibriumrEquilibrium 5% 2% 3% 5% 1% ___ 5% ___ 8% ___ 10% 2% 6% ___ 2% 0% -2% ___ Compute the missing values in the table. ?=5%,??=1%,?Equilibrium=i=5%,Eπ=1%,rEquilibrium= % ?=5%,?Equilibrium=8%,??=i=5%,rEquilibrium=8%,Eπ= % ??=10%,?Equilibrium=2%,?=Eπ=10%,rEquilibrium=2%,i= % ?=6%,?Equilibrium=2%,??=i=6%,rEquilibrium=2%,Eπ= % ?=0%,??=−2%,?Equilibrium=Suppose that you have a lottery with two states Yes and No. You are asked to toss a coin andthat if it comes up head, you will win 5% of your investment and if it comes up tail you willlose 3% of your investment. Assume that your initial investment is K1000 and that you havedecided to only toss a coin three times.i. Determine all the possible outcomes of the game at the end of the third toss andpresent your answer on a tree diagram. ii. What is the total wealth for each of the outcomes in (i) above? iii. Find the expected value of the outcomes.4 Consider an extensive game where player 1 starts with choosing of two actions, A or B. Player 2 observes player 1’s move and makes her move; if the move by player 1 is A, then player 2 can take three actions, X, Y or Z, if the move by player 1 is B, then player 2 can take of of two actions, U or V. Write down all teminal histories, proper subhistories, the player function and strategies of players in this game.
- Consider the following coordination game: Player 2P1 Comedy Show Concert Comedy Show 11,5 0,0 Concert 0,0 2,2 a. Find the Nash equilibrium(s) for this game.b. Now assume Player 1 and Player 2 have distributional preferences. Specifically, both people greatly care about the utility of the other person. In fact, they place equal weight on their outcome and the other person’soutcome, ρ = σ = ½. Find the Nash equilibrium(s) with these utilitarianpreferences.c. Now consider the case where Player1 and Player2 do not like each other. Specifically, any positive outcome for the other person is viewed as anegative outcome for the individual, ρ = σ = -1. Find the Nashequilibrium(s) with these envious preferences.Microeconomics Wilfred’s expected utility function is px1^0.5+(1−p)x2^0.5, where p is the probability that he consumes x1 and 1 - p is the probability that he consumes x2. Wilfred is offered a choice between getting a sure payment of $Z or a lottery in which he receives $2500 with probability p = 0.4 and $3700 with probability 1 - p. Wilfred will choose the sure payment if Z > CE and the lottery if Z < CE, where the value of CE is equal to ___ (please round your final answer to two decimal places if necessary)In a typical product mix model, where a companymust decide how much of each product to produceto maximize profit, there are sometimes customerdemands for the products. We used upper-boundconstraints for these: Don’t produce more than youcan sell. Would it be realistic to have lower-boundconstraints instead: Produce at least as much as isdemanded? Would it be realistic to have both (wherethe upper bounds are greater than the lower bounds)?Would it be realistic to have equality constraints:Produce exactly what is demanded?