MYECON LAB W/PEARSON ETEXT MICROECON>IP
9th Edition
ISBN: 9780134153988
Author: PINDYCK
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 11, Problem 10E
(a)
To determine
The practice of two-part pricing.
(b)
To determine
The practice of two-part pricing with two groups.
(c)
To determine
Profitability of both type players.
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You are the manager of a golf course. For simplicity assume that you only have two potential customers – a high demand customer whose inverse demand for golf services is given by P = 10 – 0.5Q and a low demand customer whose inverse demand for golf services is given by P = 8 – 0.5Q. Suppose the marginal cost to the golf course of each round of golf is zero.Suppose you have to charge both players the same two-part pricing strategy. Which of the following pricing strategies will yield the highest profit for you?
A.
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Consider a buyer who, in the upcoming month, will make a decision about whether to purchase a good from a monopoly seller. The seller “advertises” that it offers a high-quality product (and the price that it has set is based on that claim). However, by substituting low-quality components for higher-quality ones, the seller can reduce the quality of the product it sells to the buyer, and in so doing, the seller can lower the variable and fixed costs of making the product. The product quality is not observable to the buyer at the time of purchase, and so the buyer cannot tell, at that point, whether he is getting a high-quality or a low-quality good. Only after he begins to use the product does the buyer learn the quality of the good he has purchased. The payoffs that accrue to the buyer and seller from this encounter are as follows: The buyer’s payoff (consumer surplus) is listed first; the seller’s payoff (profit) is listed second. Answer each of the…
Chapter 11 Solutions
MYECON LAB W/PEARSON ETEXT MICROECON>IP
Ch. 11.A - Prob. 3ECh. 11 - Prob. 1RQCh. 11 - Prob. 2RQCh. 11 - Prob. 3RQCh. 11 - Prob. 4RQCh. 11 - Prob. 5RQCh. 11 - Prob. 6RQCh. 11 - Prob. 7RQCh. 11 - Prob. 8RQCh. 11 - Prob. 9RQ
Ch. 11 - Prob. 10RQCh. 11 - Prob. 11RQCh. 11 - Prob. 12RQCh. 11 - Prob. 13RQCh. 11 - Prob. 14RQCh. 11 - Prob. 15RQCh. 11 - Prob. 1ECh. 11 - Prob. 2ECh. 11 - Prob. 3ECh. 11 - Prob. 4ECh. 11 - Prob. 5ECh. 11 - Prob. 6ECh. 11 - Prob. 7ECh. 11 - Prob. 8ECh. 11 - Prob. 9ECh. 11 - Prob. 10ECh. 11 - Prob. 11ECh. 11 - Prob. 12ECh. 11 - Prob. 13ECh. 11 - Prob. 14ECh. 11 - Prob. 15ECh. 11 - Prob. 16ECh. 11 - Prob. 17E
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