MYECON LAB W/PEARSON ETEXT MICROECON>IP
9th Edition
ISBN: 9780134153988
Author: PINDYCK
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 11, Problem 14E
(a)
To determine
Optimal prices and profits when the goods are sold separately and as pure and mixed bundles.
(b)
To determine
Optimal pricing strategy for profit maximization.
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You are producing two complimentary products (A and B). It costs $1 to make Product A, $2 to make Product B, and $3 to make the bundle.
After some marketing research is conducted, you have the following information about the benefit (in dollars) of your products and size (number of people) for each segment.
2a) What is the maximum profit and prices under pure component pricing?
2b) What is the maximum profit and price under pure bundling?
2c) What is the maximum profit and prices under mixed bundling?
Compute the optimal prices and profits for each of the following scenarios:(a) the goods are sold separately(b) pure bundling(c) mixed bundling.
Which strategy would be most profitable? Explain why.
There are two types of consumers in Melbourne: students and non-students. The student population is 10, and each student’s demand of printing paper is Q=1−p, for p<1. The non-student population is 40, and each non-student’s demand of printing paper is Q=3−p, for p<3. Suppose OfficeMax is the only seller of printing paper in Melbourne. Assume zero production cost.
OfficeMax introduces printing paper in smaller packages targeting the students. The non-students are willing to pay 5 for a smaller package and 7 for a standard package, and the students are willing to pay 3 for a smaller package and 4 for a standard package. If a consumer does not purchase, her utility is zero. Find all the prices, Pn for a smaller package and Ps for a standard package, so that the students choose the smaller packages and the non-students choose the standard ones.
Chapter 11 Solutions
MYECON LAB W/PEARSON ETEXT MICROECON>IP
Ch. 11.A - Prob. 3ECh. 11 - Prob. 1RQCh. 11 - Prob. 2RQCh. 11 - Prob. 3RQCh. 11 - Prob. 4RQCh. 11 - Prob. 5RQCh. 11 - Prob. 6RQCh. 11 - Prob. 7RQCh. 11 - Prob. 8RQCh. 11 - Prob. 9RQ
Ch. 11 - Prob. 10RQCh. 11 - Prob. 11RQCh. 11 - Prob. 12RQCh. 11 - Prob. 13RQCh. 11 - Prob. 14RQCh. 11 - Prob. 15RQCh. 11 - Prob. 1ECh. 11 - Prob. 2ECh. 11 - Prob. 3ECh. 11 - Prob. 4ECh. 11 - Prob. 5ECh. 11 - Prob. 6ECh. 11 - Prob. 7ECh. 11 - Prob. 8ECh. 11 - Prob. 9ECh. 11 - Prob. 10ECh. 11 - Prob. 11ECh. 11 - Prob. 12ECh. 11 - Prob. 13ECh. 11 - Prob. 14ECh. 11 - Prob. 15ECh. 11 - Prob. 16ECh. 11 - Prob. 17E
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