MYECON LAB W/PEARSON ETEXT MICROECON>IP
9th Edition
ISBN: 9780134153988
Author: PINDYCK
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 11, Problem 11E
To determine
The practice of pure bundling and mixed bundling.
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Suppose all individuals are identical, and their monthly demand for Internet access from a certain leading provider can be represented as p = 80 - 4q where p is price in $ per hour and q is hours per month. The firm faces a constant marginal cost of $20. If the firm will use a two-part pricing system and charge a monthly access fee plus a per hour rate, the monthly access fee will equal
Suppose all individuals are identical, and their monthly demand for Internet access from a certain leading provider can be represented as p = 80 - 4q where p is price in $ per hour and q is hours per month. The firm faces a constant marginal cost of $20. If the firm will use a two-part pricing system and charge a monthly access fee plus a per hour rate, the monthly access fee will equal
$450.
$50.
$80.
$15.
Firms often price their products by “marking up” a fixed percentage over average cost. To investigate the consequences of markup pricing, consider a single firm that faces the demand Q = 90 − P, for P ≤ 90. The firm’s TOTAL cost function is C(Q) = 20Q.
In this example, would a 50% markup lead to a more or less efficient outcome than the profit maximizing rule in part Q3.2? How do you define efficiency? Explain.
Discuss to what extent you agree with the following statements
Price discrimination is beneficial for the society in general but it is difficult to practice in real world
Chapter 11 Solutions
MYECON LAB W/PEARSON ETEXT MICROECON>IP
Ch. 11.A - Prob. 3ECh. 11 - Prob. 1RQCh. 11 - Prob. 2RQCh. 11 - Prob. 3RQCh. 11 - Prob. 4RQCh. 11 - Prob. 5RQCh. 11 - Prob. 6RQCh. 11 - Prob. 7RQCh. 11 - Prob. 8RQCh. 11 - Prob. 9RQ
Ch. 11 - Prob. 10RQCh. 11 - Prob. 11RQCh. 11 - Prob. 12RQCh. 11 - Prob. 13RQCh. 11 - Prob. 14RQCh. 11 - Prob. 15RQCh. 11 - Prob. 1ECh. 11 - Prob. 2ECh. 11 - Prob. 3ECh. 11 - Prob. 4ECh. 11 - Prob. 5ECh. 11 - Prob. 6ECh. 11 - Prob. 7ECh. 11 - Prob. 8ECh. 11 - Prob. 9ECh. 11 - Prob. 10ECh. 11 - Prob. 11ECh. 11 - Prob. 12ECh. 11 - Prob. 13ECh. 11 - Prob. 14ECh. 11 - Prob. 15ECh. 11 - Prob. 16ECh. 11 - Prob. 17E
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