Factors that can cause a socially efficient outcome to occur in a sequential version of the “Prisoner’s dilemma”.

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Chapter 13, Problem 12Q

To determine

Factors that can cause a socially efficient outcome to occur in a sequential version of the “Prisoner’s dilemma”.

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