Microeconomics (9th Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
9th Edition
ISBN: 9780134184890
Author: PINDYCK
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 13, Problem 5E
(a)
To determine
Nash equilibria outcome.
(b)
To determine
Maximin strategy outcome.
(c)
To determine
Cooperative outcome.
(d)
To determine
The benefits of cooperative outcome.
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Alcoa and Kaiser, duopolists in the market for primary aluminum ingot, choose prices of their 500 foot rolls of sheet aluminum on the first day of the month. The following payoff table shows their monthly payoffs resulting from the pricing decisions they can make.
Suppose Alcoa and Kaiser repeat their pricing decision on the first day of every month. Suppose they have been cooperating for the past few months, but now the manager at Kaiser is trying to decide whether to cheat or to continue cooperating. Kaiser’s manager believes Kaiser can get away with cheating for two months, but he also believes that Kaiser would be punished for the next two months after cheating. After punishment, Kaiser’s manager expects the two firms would return to cooperation. Kaiser’s manager ignores the time-value of money and does not discount future benefits or costs.
Will Kaiser cooperate or cheat? Explain.
Alcoa and Kaiser, duopolists in the market for primary aluminum ingot, choose prices of their 500 foot rolls of sheet aluminum on the first day of the month. The following payoff table shows their monthly payoffs resulting from the pricing decisions they can make. Suppose Alcoa and Kaiser repeat their pricing decision on the first day of every month. Suppose they have been cooperating for the past few months, but now the manager at Kaiser is trying to decide whether to cheat or to continue cooperating. Kaiser’s manager believes Kaiser can get away with cheating for two months, but he also believes that Kaiser would be punished for the next two months after cheating. After punishment, Kaiser’s manager expects the two firms would return to cooperation. Kaiser’s manager ignores the time-value of money and does not discount future benefits or costs.
4. Suppose you were asked to manage a golf course that was currently charging a uniform price. Would you suggest that the course continue…
Alcoa and Kaiser, duopolists in the market for primary aluminum ingot, choose prices of their 500 foot rolls of sheet aluminum on the first day of the month. The following payoff table shows their monthly payoffs resulting from the pricing decisions they can make.
Suppose Alcoa and Kaiser repeat their pricing decision on the first day of every month. Suppose they have been cooperating for the past few months, but now the manager at Kaiser is trying to decide whether to cheat or to continue cooperating. Kaiser’s manager believes Kaiser can get away with cheating for two months, but he also believes that Kaiser would be punished for the next two months after cheating. After punishment, Kaiser’s manager expects the two firms would return to cooperation. Kaiser’s manager ignores the time-value of money and does not discount future benefits or costs.
What is the monthly gain to Kaiser from cheating? What is the present value of the benefit from cheating for the two months of cheating?
Chapter 13 Solutions
Microeconomics (9th Edition) (Pearson Series in Economics)
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