EXPLORING ECON.-W/ACCESS (LL) >CUSTOM<
7th Edition
ISBN: 9781305757448
Author: Sexton
Publisher: CENGAGE C
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Chapter 15, Problem 14P
To determine
To explain:
The nature of the mutual interdependence between the two firms. Whether a Nash equilibrium is evident.
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Pfizer and a competitor, Astra-Zeneca, are considering developing a new drug for a particular illness at the same time. The illness is relatively rare but the fixed cost of production is very high. In particular, the forecast demand for such a drug is insufficient to cover both firms’ costs. Analyse the interaction between the two firms using game theory. Present a payoff matrix to model the situation and analyse it for Nash equilibrium. What can either of these firms do to make their best, most- preferred outcome more likely?
Economics
Represent the following games in a normal form and find their Nash equilibria. b) Firm A decides whether to enter the market in which firm B already operates. Firm B knows about firm A’s considerations. If firm A enters the market, both firms decide at the same time whether to run an advertising campaign. In the opposite case, only firm B decides about running an advertising campaign. When both firms are in the market, each obtains profit of $3 mln if both pursue a campaign, or of $5 mln if both decide not to run a campaign. If only one firm runs a campaign, it obtains $6 mln, whereas the other firm gets $1 mln. If only firm B operates in the market, it obtains $4 mln when it advertises its product, or $3.5 mln if it does not. Firm A receives $0 if it does not enter the market.
Represent the following games in a normal form and find their Nash equilibria. b) Firm A decides whether to enter the market in which firm B already operates. Firm B knows about firm A’s considerations. If firm A enters the market, both firms decide at the same time whether to run an advertising campaign. In the opposite case, only firm B decides about running an advertising campaign. When both firms are in the market, each obtains profit of $3 mln if both pursue a campaign, or of $5 mln if both decide not to run a campaign. If only one firm runs a campaign, it obtains $6 mln, whereas the other firm gets $1 mln. If only firm B operates in the market, it obtains $4 mln when it advertises its product, or $3.5 mln if it does not. Firm A receives $0 if it does not enter the market.
Chapter 15 Solutions
EXPLORING ECON.-W/ACCESS (LL) >CUSTOM<
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- There are two firms in an industry, Firm A and Firm B. If firm A and firm B both advertise, they each will earn $5 million in profits. If neither firm advertises, they will each earn $10 million in profits. However, if one firm advertises and the other does not, the firm that advertises will earn $15 million and the non-advertising firm will earn $1 million. List all Nash equilibrium to this game. Both firms advertise Firm A advertises and Firm B does not Firm B advertises and Firm B does not Neither firm advertises No Nash equilbrium existsarrow_forwardConsider the following hypothetical case. Only BMW and a competitor, Mazda, are considering launching a new, niche HPC in the Asian market. The issue is what price to charge. Both new cars are very similar in performance and production cost. Analyse the interaction between the two firms using game theory. Present a payoff matrix to model the situation and analyse it for Nash equilibrium. What can either of these firms do to make their best, most-preferred outcome more likely?arrow_forwardTwo competing firms must choose their quantity of production simultaneously. Each firm can choose either a High quantity of 3 or a Low quantity of 2. The price for both firms is 9-Q, where Q is the sum of both their quantities. Costs are zero; the profit is simply price times quantity. For example, if firm 1 chooses High and firm 2 chooses Low, then price is 9-(3+2)=4; payoff for firm 1 is 12 while payoff for firm 2 is 8. What is the unique Nash equilibrium? (Firm 1's strategy will be written before firm 2's.)arrow_forward
- Find any Nash equilibria in the game below. Firm B Co-operate Don’t co-operate Firm A Co-operate 60 60 0 80 Don’t co-operate 80 0 10 10 a. There is one Nash equilibrium: both firms don't co-operate. b. There are no Nash equilibria. c. There are two Nash equilibria: one firm co-operates and the other firm doesn't co-operate. d. There are two Nash equilibria: (i) both firms co-operate and (ii) both firms don't co-operate.arrow_forwardTwo firms A and B produce a product jointly. The total value to the two firms from the joint venture is given by V = √iA + √iB where iA and iB are the firms’ respective investment levels. After the investment levels have been chosen, the firms divide V equally. a) Find the Nash equilibrium investment levels, and the payoffs for each firm. b) Suppose that A and B merge. Find the optimal investment levels and the payoffs for the merged firm. Do the firms benefit from the merger? Why?arrow_forward
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