Whether lee entitled to erode and displace dominant firms like coach with their upscale business model.

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Chapter 16, Problem 1.1CE

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Consider a homogeneous good industry (such as an agricultural product) with just two firms and a total market demand Q = 400−P, so the inverse demand is P = 400 − Q. Suppose both firms have a constant marginal cost equal to $100 per unit of output and a fixed cost equal to $10,000. One simple way to depict rivalry in a duopoly (2 firms) is the Cournot model. This model is reasonable in agricultural markets where firms choose production (plantings) in advance and the market price is determined later after the crop is harvested. In the Cournot model, we imagine that the two firms simultaneously choose their production or quantity and that demand (market clearing) determines the price given each firms’ quantity. (a) Suppose (hypothetically) that the second firm produces 0 units, and the first firm anticipates this, so the first firm is the only seller. How much will the first firm produce (in this case the first firm acts as a monopolist and sets output where MR = MC)? Hint: The first…