Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN: 9781337106665
Author: Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 18, Problem 18.3IP
To determine
The expected revenue from auctioning.
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A reserve price is a minimum price set by the auctioneer. If no bidder is willing to pay the reserve price, the item is unsold at a profit of $0 for the auctioneer. If only one bidder values the item at or above the reserve price, that bidder pays the reserve price. An auctioneer faces two bidders, each with a value of either $186 or $248, with both values equally probable. Without a reserve price, the second highest bid will be the price paid by the winning bidder.
The following table lists the four possible combinations for bidder values. Each combination is equally likely to occur.
A reserve price is a minimum price set by the auctioneer. If no bidder is willing to pay the reserve price, the item is unsold at a profit of $0 for the auctioneer. If only one bidder values the item at or above the reserve price, that bidder pays the reserve price. An auctioneer faces two bidders, each with a value of either $39 or $104, with both values equally probable. Without a reserve price, the second highest bid will be the price paid by the winning bidder.
The following table lists the four possible combinations of bidder values. Each combination is equally likely to occur.
On the following table, indicate the price paid by the winning bidder with and without the stated reserve price.
Bidder 1 Value
Bidder 2 Value
Probability
Price Without Reserve?
Price with $104 Reserve Price?
($)
($)
($)
$39
$39
0.25
$39
$104
0.25
$104
$39
0.25
$104
$104
0.25
Without a reserve price, the expected price is…
Chapter 18 Solutions
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
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