Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN: 9781337106665
Author: Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 18, Problem 18.1IP
To determine
The expected price.
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Company ABC holds an auction. Five bidders were invited. Company ABC estimates that each bidder has a value of either 15 or 25 for the item, and the probabilities attach to each value is 50%. What is the expected price? What is the price if three of the five bidders collude?
BPO Services is in the business of digitizing information from forms that are filled out by hand. In 2006, a big client gave BPO a distribution of the forms that it digitized in house last year, and BPO estimated how much it would cost to digitize each form.
Form Type
Mix of Forms
Form Cost
A
0.5
$3.00
B
0.5
$1.00
The expected cost of digitizing a form is
.
Suppose the client and BPO agree to a deal, whereby the client pays BPO to digitize forms. The price of each form processed is equal to the expected cost of the form that you calculated in the previous part of the problem.
Suppose that after the agreement, the client sends only forms of type A.
The expected digitization cost per form of the forms sent by the client is
. This leads to an expected loss of
per form for BPO. (Hint: Do not round your answers. Enter the loss as a positive number.)
Can you explain the "altruism and reciprocity" game theory, and provide an example? Is this the same as the "trust game?"
Chapter 18 Solutions
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
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- when playing at a casino your expected value means the amount you gain at a single play. True or Falsearrow_forwardIn a principal-agent problem, if the contract implies that the more risk-averse agent will bear less risk, we can say that this contract exhibits A.risk sharing is not optimal because the less risk-averse (or risk-neutral) agent should bear none of the risk. B.efficiency in risk-bearing. C.risk sharing is not optimal because risk-neutral agents should face no risk. D.risk sharing is not optimal because all risk should be transferred to the most risk-averse agent.arrow_forwardPlease calculate mixed strategy equilibria, if any, and then derive the probability that Arif and Aisha will find themselves at the same venue. Carefully explain the steps to your solutionarrow_forward
- Two partners start a business. Each has two possible strategies, spend full time or secretly take a second job and spend only part time on the business. Any profits that the business makes will be split equally between the two partners, regardless of whether they work full time or part time for the business. If a partner takes a second job, he will earn $20,000 from this job plus his share of profits from the business. If he spends full time on the business, his only source of income is his share of profits from this business. If both partners spend full time on the business, total profits will be $200,000. If one partner spends full time on the business and the other takes a second job, the business profits will be $80,000. If both partners take second job, the total business profits are $20,000. a) This game has no pure strategy Nash equilibria, but has a mixed strategy equilibrium. b) This game has two Nash equilibria, one in which each partner has an income of $100,000 and one in…arrow_forwardThe table below shows that a sales agent can work with either low, or high amount of effort. Low effort generates$30,000, $60,000 or $100,000 profit (with probability given below), while high effort generates 60,000; 100,000 or 150, 000 (with probability given below) depending on some random factors. Bad luck (P=0.3) Medium luck (P=0.3) Good luck (P=0.4) Low effort (a=0) $30,000 $60,000 $100,000 High effort (a=1) $60,000 $100,000 $150,000 The cost of low effort is 0 and the cost of high effort is $10,000 (Formally, c=$10,000a). The net wage is wage minus cost of effort and the net profit is total profit minus wage. Suppose the firm offers the repair person a fixed wage of 13,000, what will be the net wage of the repair person and the net profit of the owner? Suppose now the owner offers the repair person the following bonus arrangement What will be the net wage of the repair person? What will be the net profit of the owner? Specify…arrow_forwardConsider the following game in normal form. Not cooperate Cooperate Not cooperate 20,20 50,0 Cooperate 0,50 40,40 What needs to be complied with so that the players would like to cooperate? What happens when one of the players does not cooperate? Why? Define trigger strategy. Calculate the discount factor (δ) that would make both players decide to cooperate.arrow_forward
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