Microeconomics
11th Edition
ISBN: 9781260507140
Author: David C. Colander
Publisher: McGraw Hill Education
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Question
Chapter 20, Problem 11QE
To determine
Check the statement whether it is true or false.
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how do you describe the pure Nash equilibrium of a game, listing all equilibrium conditions.
True or false? If a game has a Nash equilibrium, that equilibrium will be the equilibrium that we expect to observe in the real world.
False. People don’t always act in the way that a Nash equilibrium requires. People don’t always make the necessary calculations and they take into account the outcome of others.
False. A Nash equilibrium is based on very strict assumptions that rarely hold in the real world. No real-world situation leads to a Nash equilibrium.
True. As long as people are rational and have their own self-interest at heart, real-life games will result in the Nash equilibrium.
True. Nash’s theory of equilibrium outcomes was derived from real-world interactions. The theory holds true for almost all real-world scenarios.
Consider a game where player A moves first, choosing between Left and Right. Then, after observing player A’s choice, player B moves next choosing between Up and Down. Which of the following is true?
This is a game where players A and B have the same number of strategies.
Player A will get a higher payoff than player B as A moves first.
This is game will only have one Nash equilibrium.
This is a game of perfect information.
Chapter 20 Solutions
Microeconomics
Ch. 20.1 - Prob. 1QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 2QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 3QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 4QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 5QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 6QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 7QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 8QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 9QCh. 20.1 - Prob. 10Q
Ch. 20.A - Netflix and Hulu each expects profit to rise by...Ch. 20.A - Prob. 2QECh. 20 - Prob. 1QECh. 20 - Prob. 2QECh. 20 - Prob. 3QECh. 20 - Prob. 4QECh. 20 - Prob. 5QECh. 20 - Prob. 6QECh. 20 - Prob. 7QECh. 20 - Prob. 8QECh. 20 - Prob. 9QECh. 20 - Prob. 10QECh. 20 - Prob. 11QECh. 20 - Prob. 12QECh. 20 - Prob. 13QECh. 20 - Prob. 14QECh. 20 - Prob. 15QECh. 20 - Prob. 16QECh. 20 - Prob. 1QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 2QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 3QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 4QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 5QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 6QAPCh. 20 - Prob. 1IPCh. 20 - Prob. 2IPCh. 20 - Prob. 3IPCh. 20 - Prob. 4IPCh. 20 - Prob. 5IPCh. 20 - Prob. 6IPCh. 20 - Prob. 7IP
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Similar questions
- In game theory, what is a subgame? What is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium? If possible, could you please provide an example? Thank you!arrow_forwardIs the solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game a Nash equilibrium? Why? The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game is a Nash equilibrium because no player can improve his or her payoff by changing strategy unilaterally. The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game is not a Nash equilibrium because players do not end up in the best combination for both. The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game is not a Nash equilibrium because both players can improve their payoffs by cooperating. The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game is a Nash equilibrium because it is a noncooperative game in which both players have to expect that the other is purely selfish.arrow_forwardConsider the following game. Which one of the following statements is FALSE? 1. There are 7 subgames in this extensive-form game. 2. There are 6 proper subgames in this extensive-form game. 3. (BK, CE) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. 4. (BK, DE) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibriumarrow_forward
- Use the following normal-form game to answer the following questions. a. For what values of x is strategy D (strictly) dominant for player 2? b. For what values of x is strategy B (strictly) dominant for player 1? c. For what values of x is (B, D) the only Nash equilibrium of the game?arrow_forwardFind all the Nash equilibria (in the strategic form) and the subgame perfect nash equilibria in the following game. Are they the same ?arrow_forwardIn the table below, it can be stated that it is the Nash Equilibrium: Regarding the game described by the matrix of possibilities below, it can be stated that the pair constitutes a Nash equilibrium:arrow_forward
- Consider the following game. Which one of the following statements is TRUE? 1. There are 8 subgames for this extensive-form game. 2. There are 8 proper subgames for this extensive-form game. 3. There is no Subgame Nash Equilibrium for this game. 4. There exists some Subgame Nash Equilibrium that gives the payoff 7 to Player 1 and 3 to Player 2.arrow_forwardIf a game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies, then it will not have an equilibrium in mixed strategies either. True or False?arrow_forwardWhich player (if any) has a dominate strategy? What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game? Does the game satisfy the definition of prisoner dilemma?arrow_forward
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