Microeconomics
Microeconomics
11th Edition
ISBN: 9781260507140
Author: David C. Colander
Publisher: McGraw Hill Education
Question
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Chapter 20, Problem 3IP

(a)

To determine

The Nash equilibrium of the payoff matrix.

(b)

To determine

The difference in the play of matrix if it is symmetric.

(c)

To determine

The reason why the players cooperate 60 times out of 100 games.

(d)

To determine

The choice of players when playing the 100th game.

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Students have asked these similar questions
Review Chapter 15, Table 15.4, Prisoner Dilemma. Suppose the game starts with both Jesse and Frank planning to “Stay Mum” in the lower right cell. Discuss how each player would evaluate the situation and decide whether to change decisions. If each player makes decisions to minimize the penalty, in which cell will this game end? Is there a Nash equilibrium?
Consider a game with two players who cannot communicate, and in which each player is asked a question. The players can answer the question honestly or lie. If both answer honestly, each receives $100. If one player answers honestly and the other lies, the liar receives $500 and the honest player gets nothing. If both lie, then each receives $50. a) Describe the strategies and payoffs of this game b) Construct the payoff matrix c) Compare this game to the prisoners' dilemma. Are the two games similar or different? Briefly explain your answer.
Is the solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game a Nash equilibrium? Why? The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game is a Nash equilibrium because no player can improve his or her payoff by changing strategy unilaterally. The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game is not a Nash equilibrium because players do not end up in the best combination for both. The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game is not a Nash equilibrium because both players can improve their payoffs by cooperating. The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma game is a Nash equilibrium because it is a noncooperative game in which both players have to expect that the other is purely selfish.
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