Economics (Irwin Economics)
21st Edition
ISBN: 9781259723223
Author: Campbell R. McConnell, Stanley L. Brue, Sean Masaki Flynn Dr.
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
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Chapter 21, Problem 6DQ
To determine
Government decision for merging soft drink market.
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6. The accompanying diagram shows the demand, marginal revenue, and marginal cost of a monopolist. (LO1, LO3, LO5)
a. Determine the profit-maximizing output and price.
b. What price and output would prevail if this firm’s product were sold by price-taking
firms in a perfectly competitive market?
c. Calculate the deadweight loss of this monopoly.
8. The elasticity of demand for a firm’s product is –2.5 and its advertising elasticity of demand is 0.2. (LO8)
a. Determine the firm’s optimal advertising-to-sales ratio.
b. If the firm’s revenues are $40,000, what is its profit-maximizing level of advertising?
Use the accompanying graph to answer the questions that follow. (LO1, LO2) a. Suppose this monopolist is unregulated. (1) What price will the firm charge to maximize its profits? (2) What is the level of consumer surplus at this price? b. Suppose the firm’s price is regulated at $80. (1) What is the firm’s marginal revenue if it produces 7 units? (2) If the firm is able to cover its variable costs at the regulated price, how much output will the firm produce in the short run to maximize its profits? (3) In the long run, how much output will this firm produce if the price remains regulated at $80?
11 21. Imagine an N firm oligopoly for "nominally differentiated" goods. That is, each of the N firms produces a product that "looks" different from the products of its competitors, but that "really" isn't any different. However, each firm is able to fool some of the buying public. Specifically, each of the N firms (which are identical and have zero marginal cost of production) has a captive market -consumers who will buy only from that firm. The demand generated by each of these captive markets is given by the demand function Pn A- Xn , where Xn is the amount supplied to this captive market and Pn is the price of the production of firm n. There is also a group of intelligent consumers who realize that the products are really undifferentiated. These…
Chapter 21 Solutions
Economics (Irwin Economics)
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- 6 Samsung wants to prevent Whirlpool from entering the market for high-priced, front-load washing machines. Front-load washing machines clean clothes better and use lesser water than conventional top-load machines. Even though front-load machines are more costly to manufacture than top-loaders, Samsung is nonetheless earning economic profit as the only firm making front-loaders for upscale consumers. Plan the appropriate strategic moves that can be applied by Samsung in order to deter Whirlpool from entering the market of front-load washing machines.arrow_forwardAs the manager of a monopoly, you face potential government regulation. Your inversedemand is P = 40 − 2Q, and your costs are C(Q) = 8Q. (LO1, LO2, LO6)a. Determine the monopoly price and output.arrow_forwardBased only on the knowledge that the premerger market share of two firms proposing to merge was 30 percent each, an economist working for the Justice Department was able to determine that, if approved, the postmerger HHI would increase by 1,800. How was the economist able to draw this conclusion without knowledge of the other firms’ market shares? From this information, can you devise a general rule explaining how the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is affected when exactly two firms in the market merge?arrow_forward
- 17. What is Brown Corp’s Herfindahl Index? Round to the nearest two decimal places. A. 0.27 B. 0.29 C. 0.31 D. 0.33 E. None of the above 18. If Brown takes over Green, what will be the Herfindahl Index of the combined firm? Round to the nearest two decimal places. A. 0.22 B. 0.24 C. 0.26 D. 0.28 E. None of the above 19. Brown Corporation is considering the acquisition of Green Corporation. If they do so, will the combined firm be more concentrated or less concentrated than Brown before the merger? A. More concentrated B. Less concentrated C. The same concentration D. Insufficient data E. None of the abovearrow_forward9. Suppose Warner Music and Universal Music are in a duopoly and currently limit themselves to 10 new artists per year. One artist sells 2 million songs at $1.25 per song. However, each label is capable of signing 20 artists per year. If one label increases the number of artists to 20 and the other stays the same, the price per song drops to $0.75, and each artist sells 3 million songs. If both labels increase the number of artists to 20, the price per song drops to $0.30, and each artist sells 4 million songs. Explain how revenue payoffs for each scenario are calculated. If this game is played once, how many artists will each producer sign, and what will be the price of a song? If this game is played every year, how many artists will each producer sign, and what will be the price of a song?arrow_forward1.Briefly state the basic characteristics of pure competition, pure monopoly, monopolistic competition, and oligopoly. Under which of these market classifications does each of the following most accurately fit? (a) a supermarket in your hometown; (b) the steel industry; (c) a Kansas wheat farm; (d) the commercial bank in which you or your family has an account; (e) the automobile industry. In each case, justify your classification. LO1arrow_forward
- 9. Firms 1 and 2 are proposing to merge. They offer symmetrically differentiated products and have identical costs and, therefore, identical premerger prices. (Note that “symmetrically differentiated products” means that if they charge the same price, then they have the same demand.) The common premerger price for firms 1 and 2 is $90, and the common marginal cost is $60. If firm 1 were to raise its price to $100, we know that its demand would drop by 20 units and firm 2’s demand would rise by 5 units. a. Assume the merger would reduce marginal cost by 10 percent. Using UPP, is there reason to be concerned with the merger? b. Suppose the prospective merger partners want to convince the DOJ that the merger will not raise price. Using UPP, how large must they argue the efficiency is? c. Suppose there are improved estimates of firms’ demand functions and now we know that if firm 1 were to raise its price to $100, its demand would (still) drop by 20 units, but firm 2’s demand would rise by…arrow_forwardSuppose that a small town has seven burger shops whose respective shares of the local hamburger market are (as percentages of all hamburgers sold): 23 percent, 22 percent, 18 percent, 12 percent, 11 percent, 8 percent, and 6 percent. What is the four-firm concentration ratio of the hamburger industry in this town? What is the Herfindahl index for the hamburger industry in this town? If the top three sellers combined to form a single firm, what would happen to the four-firm concentration ratio and to the Herfindahl indexarrow_forwardQuestion 1.Assume there are only two art auction companies who account for 100% of all the sales of 19thCentury impressionist master work paintings in the world. Assume that each company buys thiskind of painting and then resells the paintings at monthly auctions. Ignoring the question of anylaws that might apply, describe what economic arrangement would maximize the twocompanies’ total profits? Show with supply and demand curves what profit they would makefrom this arrangement and what societal welfare loss, if any, results from it.arrow_forward
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