Loose Leaf Microeconomics with Connect Access Card
20th Edition
ISBN: 9781259287084
Author: Campbell R. McConnell, Stanley L. Brue, Sean Masaki Flynn Dr.
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
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Chapter 22, Problem 2RQ
To determine
The group of people who are less likely to purchase insurance
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As one of the largest and fastest-growing industries in 2018, health care provided how many jobs for wage and salary workers? O 18 million 30 million 3 pts O 24 million O 12 million
Suppose that the price elasticity for hip replacement surgeries is 0.2. Further suppose that hip replacement surgeries are originally not covered by health insurance and that at a price of $50,000 each, 10,000 such surgeries are demanded each year. LO24.2 a. Suppose that health insurance begins to cover hip replacement surgeries and that everyone interested in getting a hip replacement has health insurance. If insurance covers 50 percent of the cost of the surgery, by what percentage would you expect the quantity demanded of hip replacements to increase? What if insurance covered 90 percent of the price? If insurance covers 50 percent of the bill, just assume that the price paid by consumers falls 50 percent.) b. Suppose that with insurance companies covering 90 percent of the price, the increase in demand leads to a jump in the price per hip surgery from $50,000 to $100,000. How much will each insured patient now pay for a hip replacement surgery? Compared to the original situation,…
Preventive care is not always cost-effective. Suppose that it costs $100 per person to administer a screening exam for a particular disease. Also suppose that if the screening exam finds the disease, the early detection given by the exam will avert $1,000 of costly future treatment. a. Imagine giving the screening test to 100 people. How much will it cost to give those 100 tests? Imagine a case in which 15 percent of those receiving the screening exam test positive. How much in future costly treatments will be averted? How much is saved by setting up a screening system? b. Imagine that everything is the same as in part a except that now only 5 percent of those receiving the screening exam test positive. In this case, how much in future costly treatments will be averted? How much is lost by setting up a screening system?
Chapter 22 Solutions
Loose Leaf Microeconomics with Connect Access Card
Ch. 22 - Prob. 1DQCh. 22 - Prob. 2DQCh. 22 - Prob. 3DQCh. 22 - Prob. 4DQCh. 22 - Prob. 5DQCh. 22 - Prob. 6DQCh. 22 - Prob. 7DQCh. 22 - Prob. 8DQCh. 22 - Prob. 9DQCh. 22 - Prob. 10DQ
Ch. 22 - Prob. 11DQCh. 22 - Prob. 12DQCh. 22 - Prob. 13DQCh. 22 - Prob. 14DQCh. 22 - Prob. 15DQCh. 22 - Prob. 16DQCh. 22 - Prob. 17DQCh. 22 - Prob. 18DQCh. 22 - Prob. 1RQCh. 22 - Prob. 2RQCh. 22 - Prob. 3RQCh. 22 - Prob. 4RQCh. 22 - Prob. 5RQCh. 22 - Prob. 6RQCh. 22 - Prob. 7RQCh. 22 - Prob. 1PCh. 22 - Prob. 2PCh. 22 - Prob. 3P
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