PRINC OF ECONOMICS PKG >CUSTOM<
7th Edition
ISBN: 9781305018549
Author: Mankiw
Publisher: CENGAGE C
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Question
Chapter 22, Problem 8PA
Subpart (a):
To determine
Total surplus.
Subpart (b):
To determine
The efficient outcome.
Subpart (c):
To determine
The efficient outcome.
Subpart (d):
To determine
The efficient outcome.
Subpart (e):
To determine
The efficient outcome.
Subpart (f):
To determine
The efficient outcome.
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Chapter 22 Solutions
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