Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN: 9781337106665
Author: Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 23, Problem 23.5IP
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Consider a homogeneous good industry (such as an agricultural product) with just two firms and a total market demand Q = 400−P, so the inverse demand is P = 400 − Q. Suppose both firms have a constant marginal cost equal to $100 per unit of output and a fixed cost equal to $10,000. One simple way to depict rivalry in a duopoly (2 firms) is the Cournot model. This model is reasonable in agricultural markets where firms choose production (plantings) in advance and the market price is determined later after the crop is harvested. In the Cournot model we imagine that the two firms simultaneously choose their production or quantity, and that demand (market clearing) determines the price given each firms’ quantity.
(a) Suppose (hypothetically) that the second firm produces 0 units, and the first firm anticipates this, so the first firm is the only seller. How much will the first firm produce (in this case the first firm acts like a monopolist and sets output where MR = MC)?
Hint: The first…
Consider a homogeneous good industry (such as an agricultural product) with just two firms and a total market demand Q = 400−P, so the inverse demand is P = 400 − Q. Suppose both firms have a constant marginal cost equal to $100 per unit of output and a fixed cost equal to $10,000. One simple way to depict rivalry in a duopoly (2 firms) is the Cournot model. This model is reasonable in agricultural markets where firms choose production (plantings) in advance and the market price is determined later after the crop is harvested. In the Cournot model, we imagine that the two firms simultaneously choose their production or quantity and that demand (market clearing) determines the price given each firms’ quantity.
(a) Suppose (hypothetically) that the second firm produces 0 units, and the first firm anticipates this, so the first firm is the only seller. How much will the first firm produce (in this case the first firm acts as a monopolist and sets output where MR = MC)?
Hint: The first…
A decorator, who is a monopolist, makes two types of specialty picture frames. From experience, the decorator has determined that if x frames of the first type and y frames of the second type are made and put on sale in a showroom, they can be sold for (100 - 2x) dollars and (120 - 3y) dollars each, respectively. The total cost of constructing these frames is (12x + 12y + 4xy) dollars. How many frames of each type should be produced to realize the maximum profit. and what is the maximum profit? Make sure to verify that this is indeed a maximum.
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Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
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- Suppose two brothers own identical skydiving companies but have decided to experiment with different pricing structures. The older brother’s company, Air Adventures, charges everyone the same price, while the younger brother’s company, Sky Warriors, sets its prices using a twotiered, price-discrimination model. Assuming that both companies face the same market demand curves, marginal costs, and costs of production, and wield significant market power for their service area, which of the following is most likely to occur? a. Air Adventures will generate a similar net revenue to Sky Warriors. b. Sky Warriors will generate a higher net revenue than Air Adventures. c. Sky Warriors will generate a lower net revenue than Air Adventures. d. Air Adventures will generate a higher net revenue than Sky Warriors. e. Sky Warriors will eventually switch to the Air Adventures model.arrow_forwardConsider a homogeneous good industry (such as an agricultural product) with just two firms and a total market demand Q = 400−P, so the inverse demand is P = 400 − Q. Suppose both firms have a constant marginal cost equal to $100 per unit of output and a fixed cost equal to $10,000. Suppose that the firms compete by simultaneously setting price, not simultaneously setting output. That is, suppose we consider the Bertrand model instead of the Cournot. Show that the two firms must earn lower profits. Hint: Create a two-by-two game using two different prices for each firm. One price should be the Cournot price (the Cournot is price of the good when firms produce the Cournot output you found above, which is 100 and 100, so the price is P = 400 − 100 − 100 = 200). The second price should be under 200 and over 150. Then show that the Nash equilibrium of this game is the lower of the two prices. When calculating profits, assume that each firm has equal sales (one half of demand) if they charge…arrow_forwardBased on the best available econometric estimates, the market elasticity of demand for your firm’s product is −2.5. The marginal cost of producing the product is constant at $225, while average total cost at current production levels is $300.Determine your optimal per unit price if:Instructions: Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.a. you are a monopolist. $ b. you compete against one other firm in a Cournot oligopoly. $ c. you compete against 19 other firms in a Cournot oligopoly. $ Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.arrow_forward
- Assume a market consists of two upstream firms, and they are sole suppliers of their respective products. Each of these monopolists sell at a linear price to one downstream duopolist each. What would be the effect of vertical integration (so that each upstream monopolist owns its retail outlet) on the final good price?arrow_forwardBased on the best available econometric estimates, the market elasticity of demand for your firm’s product is –2. The marginal cost of producing the product is constant at $150, while average total cost at current production levels is $225.Determine your optimal per unit price if:Instructions: Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.a. You are a monopolist.$ b. You compete against one other firm in a Cournot oligopoly.$ c. You compete against 19 other firms in a Cournot oligopoly.$arrow_forwardAre Covid-19 rapid antigen tests a Monopoly, oligopoly or a perfectly competitive marketarrow_forward
- what exit strategy are available to firms who desire to leave a market during the Covid 19 pandemicarrow_forwardBeta and Gamma produce vitamin A at a constant average cost of $5 per unit. Assume that low-price guarantees are Here are the possible outcomes: Price fixing (cartel). Each firm sells 30 units at a price of $20 per unit. Duopoly (no price fixing). Each firm sells 40 units at a price of $12 per Underpricing (one firm charges $20 and the other charges $12). The low-price firm sells 70 units and the high-price firm sells 5 a. Suppose Beta chooses a price first, followed by Gamma. Draw a game tree for the price-fixing game and predict the outcome.arrow_forwardThe four-firm concentration ratios for industries X and Y are 81 percent and 74 percent, respectively, while the corresponding Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes are 3,100 and 1,600. The Dansby-Willig performance index for industry X is 0.7, while that for industry Y is 0.55. Based on this information, which would lead to the greater increase in social welfare: a slight increase in industry X’s output or a slight increase in industry Y’s output?arrow_forward
- The Able Manufacturing Company and Better Bettors, Inc. are rival firms in the production of a calculator used by horse racing fans for handicapping (determining betting strategies). Each firm has a fixed cost of $100 and a MC = $10 in producing calculators. The demand for the industry’s product is: Q = 900 – 5P, where P is the market price and Q = Q1 + Q2. If each firm must choose how many calculators to produce and sell without knowing of its rival’s production decision, what will be the Cournot equilibrium price and quantities produced? Calculate the profit for each firm.arrow_forwardConsider a market with a duopolist structure. Each firm has similar marginal costs. Based on this information, we can conclude that: ProfitsDeceit > ProfitsCollusion > ProfitsDuopoly > ProfitsTrust in collusion ProfitsDeceit > ProfitsDuopoly > ProfitsCollusion > ProfitsTrust in collusion ProfitsDeceit > ProfitsTrust in collusion > ProfitsDuopoly > ProfitsCollusion ProfitsCollusion > ProfitsDuopoly > ProfitsDeceit > ProfitsTrust in collusionarrow_forwardWhich of the following statements about expenditures on advertising is true? If a firm knows its product is of low quality, it will be willing to spend large amounts of money on advertising. When a firm spends a small amount of money on advertising, this signals that the quality of the good is high. When a firm spends a large amount of money on advertising, advertising can be construed as a signal of quality. Read the following example and determine whether it illustrates a common critique or defense of advertising. Gilberto sees a commercial for a Brand X clothing company that depicts the wearers of the clothes out having a good time with friends. Although he doesn't particularly need new clothes, the commercial prompts him to buy a Brand X t-shirt. This illustrates a common of advertising.arrow_forward
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