Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-hill Series Economics)
9th Edition
ISBN: 9781259290619
Author: Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
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Question
Chapter 9, Problem 2CACQ
(A)
To determine
The reaction function of each firm is to be ascertained.
(B)
To determine
Each firm's equilibrium output is to be calculated.
(C)
To determine
The
(D)
To determine
Each firm's profit in equilibrium is to be ascertained.
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The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 100 – 2(Q1 + Q2) and costs are C1(Q1) = 20Q1 and C2(Q2) = 30Q2.
a. What is the reaction function for each firm?
b. What is each firm’s equilibrium output?
c. What is the equilibrium market price?
d. What is the profit each firm earns in equilibrium?
The inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly is P = 200 − 3(Q1 + Q2) and costs are C1(Q1) = 26Q1 and C2(Q2) = 32Q2.
a. Determine the reaction function for each firm.
b. Calculate each firm’s equilibrium output.
c. Calculate the equilibrium market price.
d. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium.
Analysts have estimated the inverse market demand in a homogeneous-product Cournot duopoly to be P = 180 −3 (Q1 + Q2). They estimate costs to be C1(Q1) = 21Q1 and C2(Q2) = 33Q2.
a. Determine the reaction function for each firm.
Firm 1: Q1 = − Q2
Firm 2: Q2 = − Q1
b. Calculate each firm’s equilibrium output.
Firm 1:
Firm 2:
c. Calculate the equilibrium market price.
$
d. Calculate the profit each firm earns in equilibrium.
Firm 1: $
Firm 2: $
Chapter 9 Solutions
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-hill Series Economics)
Ch. 9 - Prob. 1CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 2CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 3CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 4CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 5CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 6CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 7CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 8CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 9CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 10CACQ
Ch. 9 - Prob. 11PAACh. 9 - Prob. 12PAACh. 9 - Prob. 13PAACh. 9 - Prob. 14PAACh. 9 - The opening statement on the website of the...Ch. 9 - Prob. 16PAACh. 9 - Prob. 17PAACh. 9 - Prob. 18PAACh. 9 - Prob. 19PAACh. 9 - Prob. 20PAACh. 9 - Prob. 21PAACh. 9 - Prob. 22PAACh. 9 - Prob. 23PAACh. 9 - Prob. 24PAA
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