Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-hill Series Economics)
9th Edition
ISBN: 9781259290619
Author: Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
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Chapter 9, Problem 7CACQ
To determine
The output and profits in different markets.
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Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P = 600 − 6Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior.
Two identical firms currently serve a market. Each has a cost function of C(q) = 30q. Market demand is P(Q) = 80 − 0.01Q. The firms compete by setting prices simultaneously as in Bertrand competition. Let PB represent the equilibrium Bertrand duopoly price.The firms have proposed to merge, and they announce that this merger will result in considerable cost savings. The firms’ new cost function will have the form Cm(q) = cq + 100, 000. Note that the merged firm has positive fixed costs while the unmerged firms do not.
(a) What is the merged firm’s profit-maximizing price if the merger is approved? Is it possible for the cost savings (via c < PB) to be sufficiently large for the merged firms’ profit-maximizing price to be below the duopoly equilibrium price?
(b) Suppose that the Department of Justice permits the merger with the requirement that the new (post-merger) price must be no greater than the pre-merger price. Under what circumstances are the firms willing to go through with…
Q2. Consider a two-firms Cournot model with constant returns to scale. Assume also that the inverse demand function is P = 100 – 2Q, with marginal cost equal to 20for both firms, where Q = q1 + q2 .
c) Calculate Stackleberg equilibrium. Draw a picture of this outcome using best-response functions and isoprofit contours.
Chapter 9 Solutions
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-hill Series Economics)
Ch. 9 - Prob. 1CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 2CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 3CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 4CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 5CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 6CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 7CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 8CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 9CACQCh. 9 - Prob. 10CACQ
Ch. 9 - Prob. 11PAACh. 9 - Prob. 12PAACh. 9 - Prob. 13PAACh. 9 - Prob. 14PAACh. 9 - The opening statement on the website of the...Ch. 9 - Prob. 16PAACh. 9 - Prob. 17PAACh. 9 - Prob. 18PAACh. 9 - Prob. 19PAACh. 9 - Prob. 20PAACh. 9 - Prob. 21PAACh. 9 - Prob. 22PAACh. 9 - Prob. 23PAACh. 9 - Prob. 24PAA
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- Consider the following model of Cournot competition with fixed cost. There are two identical firms, and the inverse demand function is given byP(q1,q2) = 19−(q1 +q2). Firms have constant marginal cost, but any firm operating in this market (that is, qi > 0) must pay a license fee F . In particular, firm i’s cost function is ( attached below ) a) Derive the firms’ best response functions. (b) For what values of F, if any, will there be a symmetric (pure) Nash equilibrium in which firms produce a positive quantity? What is the Nash equilibrium in that case? (c) For what values of F, if any, will both firms shutting down be the symmetric (pure) Nash equilibrium?arrow_forwardA duopoly faces an inverse market demand of P(Q) = 240−Q.Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of MC1 (q1) = $10.Firm 2's constant marginal cost is MC2 (q2) = $20.Assume fixed costs are negligible for both firms. Calculate the output of each firm, market output, and price if there is (A) a collusive equilibrium or (B) a Cournot equilibrium. (A) Collusive equilibrium (Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places) The collusive equilibrium occurs where q1 equals ?and q2 equals ? Market output is ? The collusive equilibrium price is ? (B) Cournot equilibrium (Enter your responses using rounded to two decimal places) The Nash-Cournot equilibrium occurs where q1 equals ? and q2 equals ? Market output is ? The equilibrium occurs at a price of ?arrow_forwardAnswer the given question with a proper explanation and step-by-step solution. Suppose we have a duopoly of a homogeneous product with demand Q = 10 – P/2. The cost function of each firm is C = 10 + q*(q+1).Determine the Cournot equilibrium price and quantity.arrow_forward
- A duopoly faces an inverse market demand of P(Q) = 150−Q.Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of MC1 (q1) = $30.Firm 2's constant marginal cost is MC2 (q2) = $60.Assume fixed costs are negligible for both firms. Calculate the output of each firm, market output, and price if there is (A) a collusive equilibrium or (B) a Cournot equilibrium. (A) Collusive equilibrium (Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places) The collusive equilibrium occurs where q1 equals ?and q2 equals ? Market output is ? The collusive equilibrium price is ? (B) Cournot equilibrium (Enter your responses using rounded to two decimal places) The Nash-Cournot equilibrium occurs where q1 equals ? and q2 equals ? Market output is ? The equilibrium occurs at a price of ? arrow_forwardAnswer the given question with a proper explanation and step-by-step solution. Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P = 400 – 2Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $50 and has no fixed costs -- both firms have a cost function C(Q) = 50Q. If this market is defined as a Stackelberg Oligopoly, what is the optimal amount for the leader (firm 1) to produce? (Round to one decimal place) If this market is defined as a Stackelberg Oligopoly, what is the optimal amount for the follower (firm 2) to produce? (Round to one decimal place) What is the market price? (Round to the nearest whole number) What are the leader's (firm 1's) profits? (Round to the nearest whole number) What are the follower's (firm 2's) profits? (Round to the nearest whole number)arrow_forwardSuppose the inverse demand function for two firms in a homogeneous-product Stackelberg oligopoly is given by P = 50 − (Q1+Q2) and cost functions for the two firms are C1(Q1) = 2Q1 C2(Q2) = 2Q2 Firm 1 is the leader, and firm 2 is the follower.1. What is firm 2’s reaction function?2. What is firm 1’s output?3. What is firm 2’s output?4. What is the market price?arrow_forward
- Consider two firms that compete according to the Cournot model. Inverse demand is P (Q) = 16 − Q. Their cost functions are C (q1) = 2q1 and C (q2) = 6q2 (a) Solve for Nash equilibrium quantities of each firm (b) Suppose firm 2 becomes more inefficient and its cost function changes to C (q2) = xq2 where x > 6. How large must x be to cause firm 2 to not want to produce anything in equilibrium?arrow_forwardOLIGOPOLY 1.- Each of two firms, firms 1 and 2, has a cost function C(q) = 30q; the inverse demand function for the firms' output is p = 120-Q, where Q is the total output. Firms simultaneously choose their output and the market price is that at which demand exactly absorbs the total output (Cournot model).(a) Obtain the reaction function of a firm.(b) Map the function obtained in (a), and graphically represent the Cournot equilibrium in this market.(c) Repeat (b), this time analytically.(d) Now suppose that firm 1's cost function is C(q) = 45q instead, but firm 2's cost is unchanged. Analyze the new solution in the market.(e) Obtain the total surplus, consumer surplus, and industry profits in both cases, and compare. What is the effect of the worsening in firm 1's cost?arrow_forwardConsider a market that is a Bertrand oligopoly with 5 firms in the market. Each of these firms produce an identical product and each have the same cost function of C(Q) = 80Q. The inverse market demand for this product is P = 2480 – 2Q. How much does EACH firm produce at the equilibrium price?arrow_forward
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