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1. Prevalence refers to the proportion of participants with a risk factor or disease at a particular point in time.
2. True or False? Relative risk is an ideal form of measurement for a retrospective cohort study design because it allows researchers to recruit both individuals with the outcome of interest and individuals without the outcome of interest, then match individuals from each of the respective groups to individuals of the other group to determine if a specific exposure caused the outcome of interest.
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- Suppose a municipality were considering a ban on sugary soft drinks. They estimate that 20% of the obesity in the city can be attributed to sugary soft drinks, and thus the ban would be expected to reduce obesity by 20%, citywide. Which measure corresponds to '20%? a. Odds ratio b. Population attributable proportion c. Cumulative incidence d. Relative risk e. Risk difference f. Attributable risk among the exposedMatch the term with its corresponding definition.___ Attributable risk___ Attributable risk percent___ Relative Risk___ Incidence rateA. Compares the incidence rate of the exposed to the incidence rate of theunexposed.B. The proportion of incidence cases among the exposed that are due to theexposure.C. The number of new cases of disease in a population divided by the total numberof persons in the population who were at risk for disease during a specified periodof time.D. The absolute difference in the incidence rate between the exposed and theunexposed.Multiple Choice Adverse selection describes a situation where an individual's demand for insurance is positively correlated with the individual's risk of loss. Adverse selection occurs when someone increases their exposure to risk when insured. This can happen, for example, when a person takes more risks because someone else bears the cost of those risks. The relationship between smoking status and mortality provides a good illustration for adverse selection, especially in the case in which a life insurance company did not vary its premiums according to smoking status of its customers. To counter the effects of adverse selection, insurers may offer premiums that are proportional to a customer's risk.
- Suppose in a given state's new insurance marketplace, with community rating and no restrictions on who can buy at the community rate, the risk pool (distribution of expected health costs) is as follows: 30% of eligible enrollees' expected health costs = $1,000 (per year)65% of eligible enrollees' expected health costs = $2,0005% of eligible enrollees' expected health costs = $10,000 Now suppose one insurer, and one insurer only, were allowed to offer any premium it wanted to any potential buyer and to exclude those it did not want to cover? What premium would they likely charge and who would they sell to and who would they exclude? What would happen to the other insurers? Does this help you see why the ACA was written to apply to all insurers?Compare and contrast two quantitative tools for decision-making in conditions of certaintyQUESTION 13 The size of the uninsured and underinsured population in the United States has become an indication of the access problems in the US healthcare system.TrueFalse QUESTION 14 If the expected age of death for a male aged 20 is 75, then a 20-year-old man who dies is considered to have lost how many years of life? A. 20 years of life B. 75 years of life C. 55 years of life D. None of these QUESTION 15 Why is survival time considered to be a good indicator of health status? A. It measures health outcomes as compared to costs B. It places an emphasis on the time spent(duration) in a specific health state C. The measure accounts for mortality rates D. It measures outcomes or health state at a given point in time
- Health insurance is normally seen as a good that is most valuable to sick people, since health expenditures are highest for the sick. Yet, in the basic insurance model discussed in this chapter, actuarially-fair health insurance is worth nothing to people who are certain to become sick (p = 1). Why does the standard model produce this result? How is this different from the way real-world insurance markets work?Indicate whether the statement is true or false, and justify your answer.A risk-averse individual prefers a certain outcome to an uncertain outcome with the same expected income.Consider the following steps Celia chooses how much care, x ∈ [0,1], to take in programming her robot. This effort costs her x^2/2. Nature chooses whether the robot steps on Peter’s pet salamander, leading to emotional harm to Peter of H > 0 (with probability 1 - x). If the robot does step on the salamander then there is a chance of π that Celia will be identified as the culprit. If there is no accident (the salamander is not stepped on), then Celia’s payoff is V - x^2/2. Peter and Luke both get zero. If there is an accident, but Celia is identified as the culprit, then Celia gets V - x^2/2. Peter gets -H. Luke gets zero. If there is an accident, and Celia is identified as the culprit, then Like (the judge) decides a level of compensation D ∈ R+ for Celia to pay Peter. Celia gets V - x^2/2 - D. Peter gets D - H. Luke gets −(βH - D)^2. f) Now we turn to social otimality rather than equilibrium. Consider the value judgement that the optimal level of care is…
- Consider the following steps Celia chooses how much care, x ∈ [0,1], to take in programming her robot. This effort costs her x^2/2. Nature chooses whether the robot steps on Peter’s pet salamander, leading to emotional harm to Peter of H > 0 (with probability 1 - x). If the robot does step on the salamander then there is a chance of π that Celia will be identified as the culprit. If there is no accident (the salamander is not stepped on), then Celia’s payoff is V - x^2/2. Peter and Luke both get zero. If there is an accident, but Celia is identified as the culprit, then Celia gets V - x^2/2. Peter gets -H. Luke gets zero. If there is an accident, and Celia is identified as the culprit, then Like (the judge) decides a level of compensation D ∈ R+ for Celia to pay Peter. Celia gets V - x^2/2 - D. Peter gets D - H. Luke gets −(βH - D)^2. A) Draw a game tree to represent this model.Consider the following steps Celia chooses how much care, x ∈ [0,1], to take in programming her robot. This effort costs her x^2/2. Nature chooses whether the robot steps on Peter’s pet salamander, leading to emotional harm to Peter of H > 0 (with probability 1 - x). If the robot does step on the salamander then there is a chance of π that Celia will be identified as the culprit. If there is no accident (the salamander is not stepped on), then Celia’s payoff is V - x^2/2. Peter and Luke both get zero. If there is an accident, but Celia is identified as the culprit, then Celia gets V - x^2/2. Peter gets -H. Luke gets zero. If there is an accident, and Celia is identified as the culprit, then Like (the judge) decides a level of compensation D ∈ R+ for Celia to pay Peter. Celia gets V - x^2/2 - D. Peter gets D - H. Luke gets −(βH - D)^2. h) What would β have to equal, in order for Celia to choose the socially optimal level of x in a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ?…Consider the following steps Celia chooses how much care, x ∈ [0,1], to take in programming her robot. This effort costs her x^2/2. Nature chooses whether the robot steps on Peter’s pet salamander, leading to emotional harm to Peter of H > 0 (with probability 1 - x). If the robot does step on the salamander then there is a chance of π that Celia will be identified as the culprit. If there is no accident (the salamander is not stepped on), then Celia’s payoff is V - x^2/2. Peter and Luke both get zero. If there is an accident, but Celia is identified as the culprit, then Celia gets V - x^2/2. Peter gets -H. Luke gets zero. If there is an accident, and Celia is identified as the culprit, then Like (the judge) decides a level of compensation D ∈ R+ for Celia to pay Peter. Celia gets V - x^2/2 - D. Peter gets D - H. Luke gets −(βH - D)^2. b) Write down Celia's expected payoff when she chooses x in step 1.