2. Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with known valuations. There is one object for sale and there are two bidders. The bidders' valuations are commonly known: One bidder has valuation 5 for the object. The other bidder has valuation 10 for the object. The rules of the auction are as follows: The bidders submit bids simultaneously and indepen- dently. Only integer bids are permitted, i.e., allowable bids are 0, 1, 2, .... Each of the bidders with the highest bid is equally likely to be declared the winner (standard tie breaking). The winner gets the object and pays her bid. (a) Find each bidder's best reply function. (b) Find all Nash equilibria. (c) Are any of the Nash equilibria strict?
2. Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with known valuations. There is one object for sale and there are two bidders. The bidders' valuations are commonly known: One bidder has valuation 5 for the object. The other bidder has valuation 10 for the object. The rules of the auction are as follows: The bidders submit bids simultaneously and indepen- dently. Only integer bids are permitted, i.e., allowable bids are 0, 1, 2, .... Each of the bidders with the highest bid is equally likely to be declared the winner (standard tie breaking). The winner gets the object and pays her bid. (a) Find each bidder's best reply function. (b) Find all Nash equilibria. (c) Are any of the Nash equilibria strict?
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)
14th Edition
ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Chapter15A: Auction Design And Information Economics
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 5E
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