Study Guide for Microeconomics
9th Edition
ISBN: 9780134741123
Author: Robert Pindyck, Daniel Rubinfeld
Publisher: PEARSON
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Chapter 19, Problem 8RQ
To determine
Idea of bubble underpinned by behavioural economics
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Study Guide for Microeconomics
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- The chicken game has often been used to model crises. Recall that in this game, the two players drive straight at each other. They can choose to swerve or keep going straight. If one swerves, and the other goes straight, assume that the one that swerves gets -10 utility and the one that goes straight gets 10 utility, since the one that swerves is deemed the loser. If both swerve, both get 0 utility. If both go straight, they crash and get -50 utility. Assume both players have a discount rate of 0.9 Draw the stage game of date night List all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the single stage game Consider an infinite horizon version of Chicken. Can you get an SPNE in which the both players swerve using a grim trigger type strategy? Consider the following strategies: both players swerve, as long as neither ever went straight. If one player ever plays straight, in all subsequent rounds the player that swerved goes straight and the player that went straight swerves. Can you think…arrow_forwardVictoria founded a start-up several years ago, together with her Macedonian friends. At first, she was fairly poor and therefore very afraid of taking risks. Any negative shock could send the company into bankruptcy. Nowadays her business is thriving, stretching across several markets from Europe to Asia. Victoria no longer worries about taking monetary risks. In fact she enjoys a good gamble over horse races from time to time. How would you draw Victoria's utility function in a way that describes her changing taste for risk as her wealth increased? Please draw a graph and comment. Please do fast ASAP fastarrow_forwardBPO Services is in the business of digitizing information from forms that are filled out by hand. In 2006, a big client gave BPO a distribution of the forms that it digitized in house last year, and BPO estimated how much it would cost to digitize each form. Form Type Mix of Forms Form Cost A 0.5 $3.00 B 0.5 $1.00 The expected cost of digitizing a form is . Suppose the client and BPO agree to a deal, whereby the client pays BPO to digitize forms. The price of each form processed is equal to the expected cost of the form that you calculated in the previous part of the problem. Suppose that after the agreement, the client sends only forms of type A. The expected digitization cost per form of the forms sent by the client is . This leads to an expected loss of per form for BPO. (Hint: Do not round your answers. Enter the loss as a positive number.)arrow_forward
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